Comparative Law and Economics of Standard-Essential Patents and FRAND Royalties by Cotter, Thomas F
Scholarship Repository 
University of Minnesota Law School 
Articles Faculty Scholarship 
2014 
Comparative Law and Economics of Standard-Essential Patents 
and FRAND Royalties 
Thomas F. Cotter 
University of Minnesota Law School, cotte034@umn.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Thomas F. Cotter, Comparative Law and Economics of Standard-Essential Patents and FRAND Royalties, 
22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 311 (2014), available at https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles/237. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in the Faculty Scholarship collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu. 
Comparative Law and Economics of Standard-
Essential Patents and FRAND Royalties
Thomas F. Cotter
I. Introduction ......................................... ...... 311
II. Doctrinal Overview.........................................315
A. Contract Law ............................. ..... ...... 315
B. Patent Remedies ................................. ..... 319
1. U.S. Law ................................... ..... 320
2. Europe ................................... ...... 322
3. Asia........ .......... ................... ..... 325
C. Competition Law............ ................... ..... 327
1. U.S. Law .............................................. 327
2. Europe ......................................... 337
III. Policy Considerations ..............................................342
A. Injunctions Versus Damages ........................ ..... 343
B. The Comparative Advantages of Contract, Patent, and Competition
Law.............. ............................... 350
C. Patent Versus Competition Law ........................... 352
IV. Determining the FRAND Royalty .............................. 356
A. General Calculation Issues.......................... .................. 357
B. Microsoft v. Motorola .................................. 359
V. Conclusion ..................................................... 363
I. Introduction
Standard-setting organizations (SSOs) often require their members to disclose,
prior to adoption of a standard, any patents or pending patent applications that
might be relevant to the standard under consideration. SSOs also often require
Briggs and Morgan Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. I have presented or
will present versions of this paper at events sponsored by the Munich Intellectual Property Law
Center, the University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law, the UCLA School of Law, and
the University of Texas School of Law. I thank (in advance, where appropriate) participants of
these events for their comments and criticism. Thanks also to Norman Siebrasse for comments and
criticism, to the University of Minnesota Law School for a summer research grant, to our library
staff for assistance in tracking down sources, to the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property
and Competition Law for making its library available to me during the summers of 2011 and 2013,
and to Katherine Bryan and Matthew Sung Woo Hu for research assistance. Any errors that re-
main are mine.
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members to declare which of their patents are essential to the practice of the pro-
spective standard and to agree to license any such standard-essential patents (SEPs)
on "fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory" (FRAND) terms.' The term "RAND"
for "reasonable and nondiscriminatory" is used synonymously with FRAND. The
wording of these obligations nevertheless differs from one SSO to another, and SSO
members generally are not obligated-and choose not-to define the precise mean-
ing of "FRAND" in advance, for a variety of reasons. 2 SSOs themselves also typi-
cally do not conduct any investigation into whether patents declared to be SEPs re-
ally are, in fact, standard-essential, which is a policy choice that probably results in
some degree of overdeclaration.
Not surprisingly, the vagueness and ubiquity of FRAND commitments, cou-
pled with the importance of SEPs to the modem economy, have generated a variety
of legal questions that are playing out throughout the world, most notably in con-
nection with the Mobile Devices Patent Wars4 , a term sometimes used for the litiga-
See, e.g., Institute of Electric and Electronics Engineers Standards Association (IEEE-SA) Stand-
ards Board Bylaws Rule 6.2 (Dec. 2012), available at http://standards.ieee.org/develop
/policies/bylaws/sect6-7.html (stating general IEEE-SA Standards Board policies); COMMON
PATENT POLICY FOR ITU-T/ITU-R/ISO/IEC, available at http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-
T/ipr/Pages/policy.aspx (summarizing ITU-T/ITU-R/ISO/IEC policies); ETSI Intellectual Property
Rights Policy, Rule 6 (Nov. 2008), available at http://www.etsi.org/WebSite/document/Legal
/ETSI IPR-Policy.pdf (offering a voluntary FRAND policy). See RUDI BEKKERS & ANDREW
UPDEGROVE, A STUDY OF IPR POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF A REPRESENTATIVE GROUP OF
STANDARDS SETTING ORGANIZATIONS WORLDWIDE 48-99 (2012), available at
http://sites.nationalacademies.org/PGA/step/PGA 058712 for a study of disclosure and licensing
obligations among twelve leading SSOs, which discusses, among other things, which members are
subject to these obligations and when they must make their disclosures and commitments.
2 See Doug Lichtman, Understanding the RAND Commitment, 47 Hous. L. REV. 1023, 1027-29
(2010) (stating that among the reasons firms "might prefer the ambiguous RAND commitment
over a more conventional, explicit pricing term" are that "intricate negotiations over patent validity
and patent value would take an enormous amount of time"; that "standard-setting is a process run
by engineers, not lawyers"; that "many new technologies flop"; and that "RAND allows imple-
menting firms to wait for additional information before they commit to a specific royalty struc-
ture"). Also, there could be antitrust problems if SSO members were to engage in some sort of
collective bargaining over terms, though opinions are mixed on how serious this problem would
be. See Thomas F. Cotter, Reflections on the Antitrust Modernization Commission's Report and
Recommendations Relating to the Antitrust/IP Interface, 53 ANTITRUST BULL. 745, 786-94 (2008);
Lichtman, supra note 2, at 1046 n.65. Some SSOs encourage or require members to disclose the
maximum royalty rates they would seek, but do not engage in group rate setting. See Jorge L.
Contreras, Technical Standards and Ex Ante Disclosure: Results and Analysis of an Empirical
Study, 53 JURIMETRICS 163, 173-75 (2013).
According to studies conducted by Robert A. Myers and David J. Goodman and funded by Nokia,
half or fewer of the patents declared essential to various standards are, in fact, essential as judged
by the authors' panel of experts. See, e.g., Fairfield Resources International, Inc., Review of Pa-
tents Declared as Essential to LTE and SAE (4G Wireless Standards) Through June 30, 2009 (Jan.
6, 2010), available at http://www.frlicense.com/LTE%20Final%20Report.pdf; Fairfield Resources
International, Inc., Review ofPatents Declared as Essential to WCDM4 Through December, 2008
(Jan. 6, 2009), available at http://www.frlicense.com/wcdmal.pdf
4 See, e.g., Rebecca Haw Allensworth, Casting a FRAND Shadow: The Importance of Legally De-
fining "Fair and Reasonable" and How Microsoft v. Motorola Missed the Mark, 22 Tex. Intell.
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tion that is taking place, at present count, in at least ten countries,5 concerning rights
in patents that are alleged to cover various aspects of smartphone and other mobile
telecommunications devices. Many, though hardly all, of the patents asserted in the
Mobile Devices Patent Wars are SEPs subject to FRAND terms. Among the issues
that have arisen in these disputes are the following:
* What are the legal consequences of a commitment to license on
FRAND terms? Does such a commitment create a binding contract,
giving rise to third-party beneficiary rights? Does it (or should it) de-
prive the SEP owner of a right to obtain an injunction against an al-
leged infringer?
* Does or should the law of patent remedies generally entitle the prevail-
ing patent owner to an injunction against infringement?
* Regardless of whatever role contract or patent law may play, does or
should competition law-antitrust-limit the patentee's ability to seek
injunctive relief for the infringement of SEPs, and if so under what cir-
cumstances?
* If one or more of the above bodies of law prevents the patentee from
obtaining an injunction, is the patentee entitled to some other form of
relief? If the patentee is entitled to infringement damages, what should
those damages be? Put another way, how should courts calculate
FRAND royalties?
This article provides both an overview of how courts and other entities have
begun to address these questions in the United States and elsewhere, and an analysis
of the advantages and disadvantages of different possible approaches. More specifi-
cally, I will examine these issues through the lens of "comparative law and econom-
ics," an analytical perspective that I employ in my newly-published book on patent
Prop. LJ. (forthcoming 2014); Roger D. Blair & Thomas Knight, Problems in Sharing the Surplus,
DAVID THOMAS KNIGHT (Jan. 6, 2014), available at http://dtknight.com/Thomas Knight
/Researchfiles/PROBLEMS IN SHARING THE SURPLUS.pdf; Dennis W. Carlton & Allan L.
Shampine, An Economic Interpretation of FRAND, 9 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 531 (2013); Keith N.
Hylton, A Unified Framework for Competition Policy and Innovation Policy, in BOSTON UNIV.
SCHOOL OF LAW, LAW AND ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER No. 13-55 (June 11, 2014), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-2367283; WILLIAM H. PAGE, JUDGING MONOPOLISTIC PRICING: F/RAND
AND ANTITRUST INJURY (October 8, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-2337691; DANIEL
SOKOL & WENTONG ZHENG, FRAND IN CHINA (Feb. 3, 2014), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2335664; Christopher S. Yoo, Toward a Closer Integration of Law and
Computer Science, 57 COMMUNIC'NS OF THE ACM 33 (2014).
See Florian Mueller, List of 50+ Apple-Samsung Lawsuits in 10 Countries, Foss PATENTS (Apr.
28, 2012, 12:04 PM), available at http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/04/list-of-50-apple-samsung-
lawsuits-in-10.html (providing a list of all initial filings Apple and Samsung brought against each
other between April 2011 and April 2012).
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remedies. 6 Parisi and Luppi offer the best summary of what I view as the core fea-
tures of this perspective:
Much of the work in comparative law and economics builds on the findings of compara-
tive law by identifying interesting legal issues and analyzing them with an economic
framework. Comparative law provides a very fertile ground for the economist in search-
ing for interesting issues to analyze. The fact that legal systems choose different solutions
to common legal problems indicates that there is no single best rule to resolve the issue in
question. In situations like these economics provides valuable techniques for assessing the
comparative advantages and effects of alternative legal rules. Methodologically, compara-
tive law and economics applies the conceptual apparatus and empirical methods of eco-
nomics to the study of comparative law and legal systems.
Consistent with this methodology, I will provide both a positive and a norma-
tive response to the questions posed above. Part I presents the positive perspective
by examining the ways in which courts and other entities in the United States, Eu-
rope, and Asia have begun to address these issues as a matter of legal doctrine. Part
II provides a normative analysis of the comparative advantages and disadvantages
of injunctions versus licensing, and of patent law versus antitrust as a means for
achieving optimal outcomes. My principal normative conclusion is that courts gen-
erally should allow SEP owners to obtain damages only, and not injunctions, for the
SEP's unauthorized use; and that, in principle, it would be preferable to use contract
and patent law to achieve this result, as opposed to antitrust. At the same time,
however, I recognize (and have argued elsewhere)8 that policies that may seem ideal
in isolation and as a matter of abstract theory are not always the policies that are
best suited for use within a specific legal environment. It may be rational for differ-
ent legal systems to approach similar issues in different ways and with the use of
different tools, given the assumptions, constraints, and institutions under and within
which these systems operate. In the present context in particular, I will suggest that,
for the time being, an approach under which patent law plays a dominant (and anti-
trust a subservient) role in addressing problems raised by SEPs may be optimal for
6 See THOMAS F. COTTER, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 33
(2013) ("One way of thinking about comparative law and economics [] is as a subgenre, within the
broader field of law and economics, that involves the use of economic analysis to explain, or pre-
dict the consequences of, observed similarities and differences among the rules, standards, and in-
stitutions found in different nations, regions, and legal systems.").
Id. at 33-34 (quoting Francesco Parisi & Barbara Luppi, Quantitative Methods in Comparative
Law, in UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA LAW SCHOOL LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES,
RESEARCH PAPER No. 12-20, at 2 (May 2, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract id=2049907).
See COTTER, supra note 6, at 37-38. See also HERBERT J. HOVENKAMP, INSTITUTIONAL
ADVANTAGE IN COMPETITION AND INNOVATION POLICY 7 (2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2307141 (stating, in the context of pay-for-delay settlements of pharma-
ceutical patent litigation, that "[t]he boundaries of patent and antitrust law are defined by policy ra-
ther than nature. So it is meaningless to debate about whether this is 'really' a patent problem or
an antitrust problem. It is a policy problem that needs to be addressed in a way that makes the
proper tradeoffs between the incentive to innovate further and the consumer interest in competitive
markets and low prices. The real question is what is the best system for addressing it?").
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the United States and perhaps some other common-law jurisdictions, whereas in Eu-
rope and elsewhere competition law arguably should (as it does) play the larger
role.9 Part III then examines, from both a positive and normative perspective, the
related issue of how courts should calculate FRAND royalties, if and when they are
called upon to do so. Part IV concludes.
II. Doctrinal Overview
This Part provides an overview of different approaches to SEPs and FRAND
commitments as a matter of contract, patent, and competition law. Section*A begins
by sampling some of the leading SSO policies on intellectual property rights before
turning to the ways in which courts in the United States, Europe, and Asia have be-
gun to interpret the obligations arising from these policies. Section B then shifts to
patent law by showing how most of the world has retained the strong presumption
in favor of injunctive relief that the U.S. Supreme Court abandoned in its 2006 deci-
sion in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. 10 Finally, Section C examines how
competition law interacts with SEPs and FRAND obligations, principally in the
United States and Europe. Once again, the U.S. and European approaches appear
potentially quite different, though in precisely the opposite manner in which the pa-
tent approaches are different: whereas European patent law, standing alone, pro-
vides patent owners with a strong entitlement to injunctive relief, European compe-
tition law may be on the verge of taking a more aggressive role than would be
expected in the United States toward the regulation of SEP disputes.
A. Contract Law
As far as contract law is concerned, the relevant doctrinal questions are wheth-
er a FRAND commitment constitutes a binding contract; if so, what it obligates the
patentee and would-be licensee to do; and whether third parties (such as other SSO
members) have a right to seek enforcement of those obligations. The answers to
these questions depend upon the language of the SSO IPR policies to which the SEP
owner consents, and applicable contract law principles.
9 I will have less to say about contract law as a normative matter, due both to space and time con-
straints and to the fact that I do not fancy myself a contract scholar. From a positive perspective,
however, I thought it was important to provide a feel for how different jurisdictions have begun to
address the relevant contract-law issues. From a normative perspective, one might argue that many
of the issues surrounding FRAND-encumbered SEPs could be resolved by contract law alone, and
if so perhaps this private-law approach would be preferable-more efficient- than one that relies
on the machinery of public law (whether patent or antitrust). See Florian Mueller, Lawmakers,
Regulators, Standardization Bodies Address Abuse of Standard-Essential Patents, Foss PATENTS
(Sept. 28, 2013), available at http://www.fosspatents.com/2013/09/lawmakers-regulators-
standardization.html for a discussion of a recent effort by the IEEE to deal prospectively with some
of the relevant issues. I thank Keith Hylton for suggesting this point, though in my view, patent
and/or antitrust standards remain necessary to address externalities (third-party effects) or to fill
other gaps (such as the risk of patent holdup arising in a case in which there is no FRAND com-
mitment) that contract law would not cover.
0 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
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SSO IPR policies are varied, but among the ones most relevant to the Mobile
Devices Patent Wars are the policies of the European Telecommunications Stand-
ards Institute (ETSI), the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE),
and the common policy of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Inter-
national Organization for Standardization (ISO), and the International Electrotech-
nical Commission (IEC)." All three of these policies require members to disclose
relevant patents and to agree to license them on reasonable terms. For example,
ETSI IPR Policy Rule 6.1 states:
When an ESSENTIAL IPR relating to a particular STANDARD or TECHNICAL
SPECIFICATION is brought to the attention of ETSI, the Director-General of ETSI shall
immediately request the owner to give within three months an irrevocable undertaking in
writing that it is prepared to grant irrevocable licenses on fair, reasonable and non-
12discriminatory ("FRAND") terms and conditions under such IPR .... .
Similarly, IEEE-SA Rule 6.2 requires the SEP owner to submit a "Letter of Assur-
ance" stating, inter alia, "that a license for a compliant implementation of the stand-
ard will be made available to an unrestricted number of applicants on a worldwide
basis without compensation or under reasonable rates, with reasonable terms and
conditions that are demonstrably free of any unfair discrimination."l 3 And the
Common Patent Policy for ITU-T/ITU-R/ISO/IEC requires an SEP owner to, inter
alia, agree that it is "willing to negotiate licenses free of charge with other parties
on a non-discriminatory basis on reasonable terms and conditions."l4
So far, two"s courts in the United States have held that policies including the
ones discussed above create binding obligations under U.S. law. In the first of these
decisions, Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., Microsoft filed suit alleging that "1.
Motorola entered into binding contractual commitments with the IEEE and the ITU,
committing to license its declared-essential patents on RAND terms and conditions;
1 See BEKKERS & UPDEGROVE, supra note I for a study of twelve leading SSO IPR policies.
12 ETSI Rules of Procedure, Annex 6 Rule 6.1 (Mar. 2013), available at
http://www.etsi.org/WebSite/document/LegaVETSIIPR-Policy.pdf. Rule 4.1 requires each mem-
ber to disclose its essential IPRs in a timely fashion. Id. at Rule 4.1. Rule 6.1bis states that the
FRAND obligation shall be interpreted as binding on successors in interest, or where this is not
possible under applicable law, the FRAND obligation shall be included in any contract of transfer.
Id at Rule 6. 1bis. Unless the FRAND obligation "runs with the patent" or is otherwise included in
a contract of transfer, the lack of privity between the transferee and the SSO otherwise could create
difficulties in using contract law to enforce a FRAND obligation against a transferee. Cf Negoti-
ated Data Solutions LLC, Docket No. C-4234, at 4-12 (Sept. 22, 2008), available at
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/IntheMatter-of NegotiatedDataSolutionsComplaint and
Decision and Order.pdf (FTC consent order forbidding a transferee from reneging on a royalty
commitment made by the original patent owner, on the theory that the transferee's conduct
amounted to an unfair act or practice in violation of FTC Act § 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)).
13 IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws, supra note 1, at Rule 6.2.
14 COMMON PATENT POLICY FOR ITU-T/ITU-R/ISO/IEC, supra note 1, at 2.1.
1 See Ericsson Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., Case No. 6:10-CV-473, 2013 WL 4046225, at *25 (E.D.
Tex. Aug. 6, 2013) (stating that "If two parties negotiating a RAND license are unable to agree to
the financial terms of an agreement, it is entirely appropriate to resolve their dispute in court....
RAND licensing also includes an obligation to negotiate in good faith.").
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2. Microsoft is a third-party beneficiary of Motorola's commitments to the IEEE
and the ITU."l 6 Applying the law of the State of Washington, U.S. District Judge
James Robart agreed with Microsoft's position on these two issues'7 and rejected
Motorola's argument that the IEEE and ITU commitments were merely unilateral
offers to negotiate RAND licenses.' 8 Thus, Motorola was obligated to grant Mi-
crosoft a FRAND license, not merely "to engage in bilateral, good-faith negotia-
tions leading to RAND terms." 9 The court also rejected Motorola's argument that
the court lacked the power to create a FRAND agreement itself, stating that
"[w]ithout the ability to create (or at the very least enforce creation of) the very li-
cense Motorola has promised to grant, Motorola's obligations would be illusory."20
In addition, Judge Robart held that Motorola's commitments required that its initial
offers to license its SEPs be made in good faith, but that the "initial offers do not
have to be on RAND terms so long as a RAND license eventually issues." 2 1 In No-
vember 2012, Judge Robart held a bench trial to determine the "RAND royalty
range for Motorola's SEPs" and "a specific RAND royalty rate for Motorola's
SEPs," and in April 2013 he issued his findings of fact and conclusions of law on
these two issues. 22 A jury trial on the issue of whether Motorola breached its duty
to negotiate in good faith concluded in September 2013, with the jury returning a
verdict in favor of Microsoft in the amount of $14.5 million. 2 3
In the second case, Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., Judge Barbara Crabb
concluded, first, that Wisconsin law applied to Apple's breach of contract claim
against Motorola arising from Motorola's commitment to the IEEE, and that French
16 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 993, 997 (W.D. Wash. 2012).
17 Id. at 999.
' Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1029-32 (W.D. Wash. 2012).
19 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2012 WL 4827743, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Oct.
10, 2012).
20 Id. at *7
21 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C1O-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Apr.
25, 2013).
22 Id. As of October 1, 2013, Microsoft v. Motorola was the only publicly available U.S. decision in
which a court had actually calculated the FRAND rate. Two days later, Judge James Holderman
issued his FRAND ruling in another case. In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. I1
C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609, at *43 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013). See also Thomas F. Cotter, Judge
Holderman's RAND Ruling in Innovatio lP Ventures, LLC, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES (Oct.
3, 2013 7:54 PM), available at http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2013/10/judge-
holdermans-rand-ruling-in-in-re.html.
23 See Florian Mueller, Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings Denied in Microsoft-Google FRAND
Breach Case, Foss PATENTS (Sept. 25, 2013 9:54 PM), available at http://www.fosspatents
.com/2013/09/motions-for-judgment-on-pleadings.html (detailing the to-date latest developments
in the case). The patent infringement suit is still pending, but in November 2012 Judge Robart de-
termined that Motorola cannot obtain an injunction on eBay grounds. See Microsoft Corp. v.
Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2012 WL 5993202, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 30, 2012) ("be-
cause Motorola has always been required to grant Microsoft a RAND license agreement for its
H.264 standard essential patents, as a matter of logic, the impending license agreement will ade-
quately remedy Motorola as a matter of law.").
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law applied to the contract claim arising from Motorola's commitment to ETSI.24
Next, she determined that, under the applicable law, Motorola had made a contrac-
tual commitment to license its patents on FRAND terms, and that Apple was a third
party beneficiary of this commitment. With this framework in place, Judge Crabb
held, "Apple must prove that Motorola's initial offer of a 2.25% royalty rate and at-
tempts to negotiate were unfair, unreasonable or discriminatory and violated
Motorola's commitments to ETSI and IEEE."25 She expanded on this point in a
subsequent ruling, stating that "it makes sense to allow Apple to sue for specific
performance of Motorola's contractual obligations and for the court to determine
license terms, if necessary. In fact, in situations such as this in which the parties
cannot agree on the terms of a fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory license, the
court may be the only forum to determine license terms."26 When Apple subse-
quently refused to declare that it would consider itself bound by Judge Crabb's de-
termination of what a FRAND royalty would be, however, she dismissed Apple's
claims.27
Courts in other countries, by contrast, so far have reached very different re-
sults. The German cases, for example, have held that an SEP owner's FRAND
commitment does not invest third parties with a right to obtain a license, or consti-
tute a waiver of the right to obtain an injunction. Rather, a FRAND commitment
merely amounts to an invitation for third parties to make offers.2 8 Similarly, in
2012, in a dispute between Samsung and Apple, a Dutch court concluded that the
ETSI IPR Policy did not of its own force create a license between Samsung and
Apple (though it did not state whether Samsung had a contractual duty to conclude
such a contract, or whether the FRAND commitment is merely an invitation for of-
fers). 29 The only other country I am aware of in which the issue has been litigated
24 Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1081-82 (W.D. Wis. 2012).
25 Id. at 1087.
26 Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 2012 WL 5416941, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 29, 2012).
27 Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 2012 WL 5416931, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 29, 2012), re-
consideration denied, 2012 WL 7989412 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 8, 2012), 2012 WL 5943791 (W.D.
Wis. Nov. 28, 2012).
28 See Landgericht Mannheim [LG] [Regional Court] May 2, 2012, 2 O 240/11, at B.II (Ger.);
Landgericht Mannheim [LG] [Regional Court] May 2, 2012, 2 O 387/11, at B.II (Ger.); Landger-
icht Dilsseldorf [LG] [Regional Court] Aug. 4, 2011, http://openjur.de/u/450408.html (Ger.). Cop-
ies of the latter two decisions-the first in the original German and in English translation, the sec-
ond in English translation only-can be found at http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/05/german-
approach-to-frand-lets-err-on.html. For scholarly discussion of the contract issues under German
law, see, e.g., CLAUDIA TAPIA, INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, TECHNICAL STANDARDS AND
LICENSING PRACTICES (FRAND) IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 18-36, 39-40 (2010)
(arguing that under German law it is possible that a FRAND commitment constitutes a binding
pre-contract for the benefit of third parties) (citing, inter alia, STEFAN MAA8EN, NORMUNG,
STANDARDISIERUNG UND IMMATERIALGOTERRECHTE 313-21 (2006)).
29 Rb.'s-Gravenhage, 14 maart 2012, m.nt. % 4.2-4.7 (Samsung Elecs. Co./Apple Inc.) (Neth.),
available at http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2012:BV8871.
See also Michael Frahlich & Gertjan Kuipers, FRAND and Injunctive Relief, AIPPI E-NEWS, No.
25 (July 2012), available at https://www.aippi.org/enews/2012/edition25/MichaelFrohlich.html;
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to date is South Korea, where in another dispute between Apple and Samsung, a
court in 2012 rejected Apple's defense that Samsung's FRAND commitment consti-
tuted a binding contract or a commitment to forsake injunctive relief.30
B. Patent Remedies
Aside from contract law, other bodies of law also may be relevant to the ques-
tion of whether an SEP owner may obtain injunctive relief for the infringement of a
patent subject to a FRAND commitment. One of these bodies of law is competition
law, which I discuss in section C below. Another possibility is that patent law it-
self-or other bodies of law, including the law of remedies or generally applicable
provisions of civil law, as applied to patent rights-may have a say in the matter.
I'll discuss these possibilities first because they provide a more promising basis for
denying injunctive relief in the United States, as well as the background against
which the competition-law defense, which is of central importance at present in Eu-
rope, may be understood.
Christof Karl, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON SCHOOL OF LAW, The FRAND Defense in European
Litigation Involving Standard-Essential Patents (Mar. 27, 2013), available at
https://courses.law.washington.edulTakenakaT/P506ab Spl3/powerpoints.html; Torsten Korber,
Machtmissbrauch durch Erhebung patentrechtlicher Unterlassungsklagen? Eine Analyse unter
besonderer Beriicksichtigung standard ellentieller Patente, WRP 2013, 734, 740-41; Florian
Mueller, Samsung Suffers Second and Even More Important FRAND Defeat to Apple in the Neth-
erlands, Foss PATENTS (Mar. 14, 2012, 4:40 PM), available at
http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/03/samsung-suffers-second-and-even-more.html. Notwithstand-
ing the court's holding on the contract issue, the overall outcome was relatively favorable to Ap-
ple, as discussed infra at notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
30 See Haksoo Ko, Facilitating Negotiation for Licensing Standard Essential Patents in the Shadow
of Injunctive Relief Possibilities 6 (May, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-2267280
(discussing Seoul District Court [Dist. Ct.], 2011Kahap39552, Aug. 24, 2012 (S. Kor.)). See also
Seoul District Court [Dist. Ct.], 201 1Kahap39552, Aug. 24, 2012 (S. Kor.) (concluding that French
law governed questions relating to the ETSI policy at issue; that under French law, there was no
binding contract or third-party beneficiary contract; and that a FRAND declaration only imposes a
general obligation upon the declarant to negotiate in good faith, honoring the mandate of the
FRAND terms, and does not automatically grant any third party an immediate, irrevocable right to
use the SEPs on its own terms).
See Yoshiyuri Tamura, Standardization and Patent Rights: Legal Issues Concerning the Applica-
tion of the RAND Provisions, in THE EXERCISE OF ESSENTIAL PATENTS FOR STANDARDS, 21 IIP
BULL. 1, 2-3 (2012) for discussion of how Japanese courts might address the breach of contract is-
sue. Finally, according to reports, a court in Shenzhen earlier this year held that InterDigital vio-
lated Chinese competition law by, inter alia, charging excessive royalties and commencing an ITC
action in the United States while negotiations between the companies were pending; the court im-
posed a FRAND royalty rate of 0.019% on sales of Huawei products. Huawei had also alleged
that InterDigital failed to negotiate on FRAND terms with Huawei, as required under the ETSI pol-
icy. On this issue, the court reportedly held that Chinese law applied and that InterDigital's offers
were not FRAND. See Shylah R. Alfonso & Kevin A. Zeck, Chinese Court Issues Landmark De-
cision Determining a FRAND Royalty Rate, AM. BAR ASS'N, ANTITRUST SECTION, INTELL. PROP.
COMM. TIDBITS, Apr. 1-5, 2013, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba
/publications/antitrustlaw/at315000_tidbits_20130405.authcheckdam.pdf. The decision has not
been published.
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1. U.S. Law
In patent infringement litigation, courts in the United States until recently
awarded the prevailing patent owner a permanent injunction absent "exceptional
circumstances." In the 2006 eBay32 decision, however, the Supreme Court held
that courts should instead consider four equitable factors before awarding a perma-
nent injunction. Specifically, the prevailing plaintiff must demonstrate:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as
monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the
balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted;
33
and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.
Since eBay, prevailing patent owners have obtained permanent injunctions in about
75% of cases,3 4 as opposed to close to 100% before.35
Applying eBay, Judge Robart in the Microsoft case discussed in Part I held that
Motorola would not have been entitled to a permanent injunction against Mi-
crosoft's alleged infringement of Motorola's FRAND-encumbered SEPs, because
the FRAND commitment demonstrates the existence of an adequate remedy at law
and the absence of irreparable harm if an injunction is not entered.36 Judge Posner,
sitting as a trial court judge in Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., reached the same con-
clusion.37 Doctrinally, these two decisions appear to be on solid ground to the ex-
tent they rest on the adequacy of the remedy at law and the absence of irreparable
harm.38 Moreover, the other two factors-the balance of convenience and the pub-
lic interest-also arguably weigh against the entry of injunctive relief in the typical
case involving FRAND-encumbered SEPs, given that the defendant typically needs
access to SEPs in order to market its products, and that injunctive relief therefore
creates a substantial risk of patent holdup (as discussed below).39 Thus, while eBay
counsels against the use of "broad classifications" and "categorical" rules for or
31 MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 547 U.S. 388
(2006).
32 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
33Id. at 3 91.
34 Patstats.org lists 165 cases granting permanent injunctions post-eBay, as of December 3, 2012, and
57 denying them. See U.S. Patent Litigation Statistics, PATSTATS.ORG (Aug. 15, 2013), available
at http://www.patstats.org/Patstats2.html.
3 Prior to eBay, there were a few unusual cases in which courts denied permanent injunctions. See,
e.g., Vitamin Tech., Inc. v. Wis. Alumni Res. Found., 146 F.2d 941, 944 (9th Cir.1944); City of
Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577, 593 (7th Cir. 1934).
36 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C1O-1823JLR, 2012 WL 5993202, at *6-7 (W.D. Wash.
Nov. 30, 2012).
3 Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 913-15 (N.D. Ill. 2012) appeal dismissed (May
21, 2014), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.,
sitting by designation). This matter is currently on appeal.
38 But see infra notes 153-62 and accompanying text (discussing counterarguments that dispensing
with injunctive relief risks undercompensating the patentee-which, if true, might suggest that the
remedy at law is not adequate).
39 See infra Part II.A.
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against the entry of injunctive relief,40 one might safely conclude that the applica-
tion of the eBay factors in the typical case involving an SEP generally would mili-
tate against the use of permanent injunctions.
The principal complication under U.S. law is the availability, in many instanc-
es, of a parallel forum for litigating patent infringement matters, namely the Interna-
tional Trade Commission (ITC). The ITC is a federal agency that hears complaints
arising under § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, which declares unlawful (among other
things) "the importation into the United States, the sale for importation, or the sale
within the United States after importation . .. of articles that . .. infringe a valid and
enforceable United States patent."A As I have explained elsewhere, the ITC has be-
come an increasingly popular venue for litigating patent matters in recent years for a
variety of reasons, one of them being the limited nature of the relief available: the
ITC can only award exclusion and cease-and-desist orders-i.e., injunctive relief-
not monetary damages, 42 and it is not bound by the eBay decision.43 The ITC is
supposed to consider the public interest, however, before entering an exclusion or-
der,44 and in recent cases the issue has arisen whether the public interest would be
served by excluding infringing products that incorporate SEPs subject to FRAND
obligations. In one recent high-profile investigation, the ITC on June 4, 2013 held
that Samsung was entitled to an exclusion order prohibiting the entry into the Unit-
ed States of certain models of Apple iPhones and iPads that infringed one of Sam-
sung's patents, even though the Samsung patent at issue was standard-essential and
subject to a FRAND commitment. 4 5 The Commission specifically rejected Apple's
40 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393 (2006).
41 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B). The ITC is a body that enforces border measures against the importa-
tion of infringing goods. Many countries restrict the importation of patent-infringing merchandise,
but to my knowledge only the United States and South Korea have created separate quasi-judicial
bodies to implement these restrictions. Elsewhere, if the Customs Service interdicts allegedly in-
fringing goods and the importer objects, the matter typically plays out in the same court that would
hear any other infringement action. See Thomas F. Cotter, The International Trade Commission:
Reform or Abolition? A Comment on Colleen V Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the
TIC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REv. ONLINE 43, 48-49, n.96 (2013).
42 See id. at 45. The fact that the ITC cannot award damages might seem like a disadvantage, but
ITC proceedings do not preclude parallel infringement proceedings in district court (and ITC
judgments do not have preclusive effect in those proceedings). However, see Jenna Greene, ITC
Docket Returning to 'Normal:' Large Corporations Are Using the Forum Less for Their Major
Disputes, NAT. L.J. 1 (2012), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ
.jsp?id=1202604295341&slretum=20130804214810 for some evidence that its popularity may be
waning.
43 See Spansion, Inc. v. ITC, 629 F.3d 1331, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 758
(2011).
44 See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (providing that the ITC "shall direct that the articles concerned . .. be ex-
cluded from entry into the United States, unless, after considering the effect of such exclusion up-
on the public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the United States economy, the produc-
tion of like or directly competitive articles in the United States, and United States consumers, it
finds that such articles should not be excluded from entry").
45 See Notice of Final Determination, In the Matter of Certain Electronic Devices, Inv. No. 337-TA-
794 (ITC June 4, 2013).
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defense saying, "it would be contrary to the public interest to allow Samsung to ob-
tain a remedy in this investigation because Samsung has breached an alleged obliga-
tion to offer Apple a license to the '348 patent on FRAND terms," or that Samsung
had in fact breached any such obligations.46 But another quirk of ITC practice is
that the statute authorizes the President of the United States to veto any exclusion
order within sixty days of the ITC's decision.47 (Pursuant to an executive order is-
sue in 2005, the president delegated this authority to the United States Trade Repre-
sentative.48) On August 3, 2013, U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman exer-
cised his authority to disapprove the ITC's June 4 exclusion order, on the ground
that the relevant policy considerations-specifically, concerns about holdup-
generally weigh against permitting injunctions in cases involving SEPs subject to
FRAND obligations. 49 Although it may be too early to state with confidence the
impact of the disapproval, the decision may encourage the ITC to deny exclusion
orders in other cases involving SEPs, and thus to discourage patent owners from fil-
ing in the ITC to avoid eBay.s
2. Europe
As far as patent law alone is concerned, the situation in Europe at present is
quite different, although there appears to be some room for flexibility. Article 12 of
the EC's 2004 Enforcement Directive, for example, states that members "may pro-
vide that, in appropriate cases," courts may order, in lieu of an injunction, "pecuni-
ary compensation to be paid to the injured party instead of applying the measures
provided for in this section if that person acted unintentionally and without negli-
gence, if execution ... would cause . . . disproportionate harm and if pecuniary
46 See In the Matter of Certain Electronic Devices, Inv. No. 337-TA-794 (ITC July 5, 2013) (public
version), slip op. at 41-64, 107-14.
47 19 U.S.C. § 1337(j)(2) (2004).
48 Assignment of Certain Functions Under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 70 Fed. Reg. 43251
(July 21, 2005).
49 Letter from Michael B.G. Froman, Exec. Office of the President of the U.S. Trade Rep., to Hon.
Irving A. Williamson, Chairman, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, Aug. 3, 2013, available at
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/AppleLetter.pdf (stating that "whether public in-
terest considerations counsel against a particular exclusion order depends on the specific circum-
stances at issue," but that "to mitigate against patent hold-up, exclusionary relief from the Com-
mission based on FRAND-encumbered SEPs should be available only" when, for example, "'a
putative licensee refuses to pay what has been determined to be a FRAND royalty, or refuses to
engage in a negotiation to determine F/RAND terms,' or "'is not subject to the jurisdiction of a
court that could award damages') (quoting U.S.DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF., POLICY STATEMENT ON REMEDIES FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS SUBJECT TO
VOLUNTARY F/RAND COMMITMENTS, at 7-8 (Jan. 8, 2013), available at
www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/290994.pdf).
50 For another interesting case in somewhat the same vein, see Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI
Corp., No. C-12-03451 RMW, 2013 WL 2181717 (N.D. Cal. May 20, 2013) (enjoining the de-
fendants from enforcing "any exclusion order or injunctive relief by the ITC," which obligation
"shall remain in effect until this court has determined defendants' RAND obligations and defend-
ants have complied therewith").
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compensation ... appears reasonably satisfactory."51 As I have noted elsewhere,
taken at face value, this provision would appear to permit member states of the Eu-
ropean Union to adopt something like an eBay rule if they chose to do so.52 Simi-
larly, Rule 118(2) of the current version of the Draft Rules of Procedure for the con-
templated Unified Patent Court53 has language very similar to article 12 of the Di-
Directive5 4 and, unlike the Directive, will if adopted have the force of law, whereas
the Directive merely authorizes member states to implement such a rule. There are
other complications, however, which as a practical matter may take much of the
force out of Rule 118(2), and which I need not go into here.s
At present, however, in the major European venues for patent litigation-
Germany, France, the U.K., and the Netherlands-injunctive relief still remains, by
far, the presumptive remedy for patent infringement.5 6 For example, courts in Ger-
many-home to at least half of all patent infringement suits within Europe57
almost always grant the prevailing patent owner injunctive relief, subject only to the
possibility of the defendant's successfully raising the competition-law defense dis-
cussed below in Part 111.58 The situation is a little more complex in the Netherlands.
5 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the En-
forcement of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 12, 2004 OJ. (L 195) 16, 23 (EC) [hereinafter EC
Enforcement Directive].
52 See COTTER, supra note 6, at 245-48.
s See id. at 228-29 (discussing agreement among, at the time, 25 of the 27 member states of the E.U.
to institute a Unified Patent Court that would serve as the forum for infringement disputes within
the E.U.) The Agreement on a Unified Patent Court will enter into force no earlier than January 1,
2014. European Union Institutions, Bodies, Offices and Agencies, Agreement on a Unified Patent
Court (2013/C 175/01), art. 89, art. 22. Eventually the court will be the exclusive forum for litigat-
ing European patents and European Patents with Unitary Effect. See id. art. 2(e)-(g), 3, 32.
54 Preliminary set of provisions for the Rules of Procedure ("Rules") of the Unified Patent Court,
Ref. Ares (2013) 2443291-21/06/2013, R.118(2) (15th draft, May 31, 2013), available at
http://www.unified-patent-court.org/images/documents/draft-rules-of-procedure.pdf ("In appro-
priate cases and at the request of the party liable to the orders and measures provided for in para-
graph 1 the Court may order damages and/or compensation to be paid to the injured party instead
of applying the orders and measures if that person acted unintentionally and without negligence, if
execution of the orders and measures in question would cause such party disproportionate harm
and if damages and/or compensation to the injured party appear to the Court to be reasonably satis-
factory.").
5 See also, Thomas F. Cotter, Effect of the Unified Patent Court on Patent Remedies, COMPARATIVE
PATENT REMEDIES (July 7, 2013, 1:20 AM), available at http://comparativepatentremedies
.blogspot.com/2013/07/effect-of-unified-patent-court-on.html; Thomas F. Cotter, Effect of the Uni-
fled Patent Court on Patent Remedies, Part 2, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES (July 9, 2013, 8:05
AM), available at http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2013/07/effect-of-unified-
patent-court-on 9.html; and Thomas F. Cotter, Effect of the Unified Patent Court on Patent Reme-
dies, Part 3, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES (July 12, 2013, 8:04 AM), available at
http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2013/07/effect-of-unified-patent-court-on 12.html.
56 See COTTER, supra note 6, at 180-82, 245-46.
5 See id. at 233.
58 See id. at 245-48; see also Axel Walz, Patentverletzungen im Lichte des Kartellrechts: In Sachen
Europdische Kommission gegen Orange-Book, GRUR INT. 8-9/2013, 718, 718 (stating that in con-
trast to the American equity right, all intellectual property codes according to European and Ger-
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Although some commentators have asserted that Dutch courts almost always award
injunctive relief,59 in one recent case involving Samsung's assertion of an SEP
against Apple the court specifically declined to do so (and without citing a competi-
tion-law based rationale). 60 The court reasoned that an injunction would have ena-
bled Samsung to abuse its patent rights, because the terms Samsung had offered
were not FRAND, and the evidence did not show that Apple was unwilling to take a
license.
Of the four, the U.K. appears to provide courts with the greatest degree of dis-
cretion in awarding injunctions, though the governing law stops well short of em-
bracing eBay. In a recent infringement suit brought by IPCom against Nokia, for
example, Justice Roth of the English Patent Court indicated that he was unlikely to
grant an injunction in light of IPCom's representation that it would license its SEP
on FRAND terms and Nokia's willingness to accept such a license. IPCom thereaf-
ter voluntarily withdrew its request for injunctive relief.62 More generally, as dis-
man law view the claim for an injunction as an essential feature of their respective exclusive
rights). Walz also argues, however, that European courts could look to article 3(2) of the EC En-
forcement Directive, which states that "Those measures, procedures and remedies shall also be ef-
fective, proportionate and dissuasive and shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation
of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse," as a basis for lim-
iting the right to obtain an injunction in some cases. See Walz, supra, at 727-28. Other commen-
tators also have suggested that German courts could depart from the presumption in favor of in-
junctive relief in an appropriate case. See COTTER, supra note 6, at 247-48 (citing sources). See
also HEINRICH TETZNER, DAS MATERIELLE PATENTRECHT DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 87-
88 (1972) (asserting that a court should deny the patent owner an injunction where the harm to the
defendant would be disproportionate); Thomas F. Cotter, Tetzner on Permanent Injunctions Under
German Law, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES (Aug. 5, 2013), available at
http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2013/08/tetzner-on-permanent-injunctions-under.html.
59 See COTTER, supra note 6, at 246 n.220 (citing sources).
60 See Rb.'s-Gravenhage, 14 maart 2012, m.nt. (Samsung Elecs. Co./Apple Inc.) (Neth.), available at
http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2012:BV8871.; see also
sources cited supra note 29.
61 See Rb.'s-Gravenhage, 14 maart 2012, m.nt. T 4.31-4.44 (Samsung Elecs. Co./Apple Inc.)
(Neth.), available at http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2012
:BV8871. The decision contrasts with the same court's decision in Rb's-Gravenhage, 17 Maart
2010, 316533 m.nt. Nos. 08-2522, 08-2524, . 6.18-6.27, 6.44-6.45 (Koninlijke Philips Elecs.
N.V./SK Kassetten GmbH) (Neth.). As discussed in the sources cited supra in note 29 and in Fa-
bio Babey & Salim Rizvi, Die FRAND-Selbsverpflichtung: Fair, Reasonable and Non-
Discriminatory Terms (FRAND) im Lichte des Kartellrechts, WuW 09/2012, 808, 814-15, in this
earlier case the court held that a FRAND commitment did not preclude the patentee from obtaining
an injunction, and that the burden of seeking to obtain a license prior to entering the market rested
on the defendant. A partial translation into English can be found at http://www.eplawpatentblog
.com/eplaw/2010/03/nl-philips-v-sk-kasetten-frand.html. On the question of whether other coun-
tries, including Germany, could recognize an abuse of right defense in a case involving SEPs, see
TAPIA, supra note 28, at 39-41, 51, 74-75, 78-79; Thomas F. Cotter, Abuse of Right as a Ra-
tionale for Denying Injunctive Relief (and Damages?), COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES (Aug. 26,
2013), available at http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2013/08/abuse-of-right-as-
rationale-for-denying.html.
62 See Peter Bell, Standards Essential Patents: UK and US, EUROPEAN PATENT LAWYER
ASSOCIATION (Apr. 22, 2013), available at http://www.eplaw.org/Downloads/
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cussed in a recent paper by Lundie-Smith and Moss, 63 the foundational case in the
U.K. is Shelfer v. City of London Electric Lighting Co.," which states that damages
may be preferable to an injunction "(1) If the injury to the plaintiff 's legal rights is
small, (2) And is one which is capable of being estimated in money, (3) And is one
which can be adequately compensated by a small money payment, (4) And the case
is one in which it would be oppressive to the defendant to grant an injunction." In
the authors' view, this standard permits some flexibility, but (unlike eBay) it places
the burden of overcoming the presumption in favor of injunctive relief on the de-
fendant and does not directly take into account the public interest or the balance of
convenience.
3. Asia
To my knowledge, thus far the only other countries in which an SEP owner's
entitlement to injunctive relief has been adjudicated are South Korea and Japan. As
noted previously, in the Korean Samsung v. Apple decision the court awarded Sam-
sung an injunction on the ground that Samsung's FRAND commitment did not con-
stitute a binding contract.67 In addition, according to Haksoo Ko, the court rejected
Apple's argument that Samsung's filing of a lawsuit seeking injunctive relief consti-
tuted an abuse of patent rights, reasoning that "a FRAND declaration, without more,
cannot be construed to include a commitment not to seek ... injunctive relief."68
An abuse of rights argument, however, was successful in a dispute between
Apple and Samsung in Japan. In a decision handed down in February 2013, the To-
kyo District Court held that Samsung could not obtain damages for the infringement
of a SEP asserted against Apple due to Samsung's "abuse of right. In particular,
Bell_Young EPLAW Congress SEPs.pdf, Florian Mueller, UK High Court Denies a Patent In-
junction Against Nokia in Light of a FRAND Commitment, Foss PATENTS (May 30, 2012), availa-
ble at http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/05/uk-high-court-denies-patent-injunction.html. There is
no written opinion on the issue, however.
63 Robert Lundie-Smith & Gary Moss, Bard v. Gore: To Injunct, or Not to Injunct, What Is the
Question? Is It Right to Reward an Infringer for Successfully Exploiting a Patent?, 8 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. & PRAc. 359, 361 (Apr. 2013). See also COTTER, supra note 6, at 179-82, and sources
cited therein.
6 Shelfer v. City of London Electric Lighting Co., [1895] 1 Ch. 287 (A.C.) (Eng.).
6 Id. at 322-23.
66 See Lundie-Smith & Moss, supra note 63, at 367.
67 See Ko, supra note 30, at 4-6.
68 See id. at 6. See also Samsung Elec. v. Apple Korea Ltd., supra note 30, at 192-94 (concluding
that Samsung did not abuse its rights).
69 See Tomofumi Sato, Apple Japan Limited Liability Company (Plaintifi) v. Samsung Electronics
Co., Ltd. (Defendant), Tokyo District Court/Judgment of Feb. 28, 2013/Case No. 2011 (wa) No.
38969; Case to seek declaration of nonexistence of liability, 38 AIPPI J. 174 (2013). A translation
of portions of the judgment provided by Apple, Inc., can be found in Respondent Apple, Inc.'s No-
tice of New Facts Related to the Commission's Questions on the Issues Under Review, and on
Remedy, Bonding, and the Public Interest, In the Matter of Certain Electronic Devices, Inv. No.
337-TA-794 (FTC Mar. 4, 2013), available at http://www.fosspatents.com/2013/03/japanese-
court-deemed-samsungs-delayed.html [hereinafter Apple Translation].
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the court held that, under the Civil Code of Japan, while "there are no express pro-
visions regarding the duties of parties at the stage of preparation for contract execu-
tion ... it is reasonable to understand that, in certain cases, parties that have entered
into contract negotiations owe a duty to each other under the principle of good faith
to provide the other party with important information and to negotiate in good
faith."70 The court rejected Samsung's argument that the duty to negotiate in good
faith had not arisen because Apple's offer reserved the right to contest validity, and
concluded that Samsung had not acted in good faith because, inter alia, it had re-
fused to disclose information Apple had requested to substantiate Samsung's offer
of a 2.4% royalty for all patents essential to the UMTS standards, and had continued
to seek a preliminary injunction in the Japanese proceedings.7 1 The court therefore
concluded that Samsung's conduct constituted an abuse of rights precluding Sam-
sung from the right to seek damages from Apple.72
The matter has also been the subject of discussion in Chinese patent circles, as
discussed by Chengjian and Xiao,73 though without any definitive resolution. As I
discuss in my book, however, based on some limited case law and a 2008 speech by
Supreme People's Court Justice Cao Jianming, there is reason to believe that Chi-
70 Apple Translation, supra note 69, at 10. Article 1 of the Japanese Civil Code states:
(1) Private rights must conform to the public welfare.
(2) The exercise of rights and performance of duties must be done in good faith.
(3) No abuse of rights is permitted.
MINPO [MINPO ][Civ. C.] art. 1, no. 1. A translation is available on a Japanese government website
at http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000056024.pdf. See also Florian Mueller, Japanese Court
Deemed Samsung's Delayed Disclosure of Essential Patents Abusive Conduct, Foss PATENTS
(Mar. 5, 2013, 6:44 PM), available at http://www.fosspatents.com/2013/03/japanese-court-
deemed-samsungs-delayed.html (noting that there is a parallel in certain provisions of the German
Constitution and Civil Code).
71 See Sato, supra note 69, at 175; Apple Translation, supra note 69, at 11-13.
72 See Sato, supra note 69, at 175; Apple Translation, supra note 69, at 13. According to Christoph
Rademacher, there also has been a good deal of discussion in Japan concerning whether to adopt
an eBay-like rule, but "[in light of the low success rates of Japanese patentees in Japanese patent
infringement lawsuits and the difficulties defending the validity of plaintiffs' patents, the consen-
sus in the Japanese patent community has been to refrain, at least for the time being, from intro-
ducing any measures that would result in further weakening the status of the patentee." Christoph
Rademacher, Injunctive Relief in Patent Cases in the US, Germany and Japan: Recent Develop-
ments and Outlook, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW 325, 341
(Toshiko Takenaka ed. 2013). For discussion of win rates and invalidity rates in Japan, see
COTTER, supra note 6, at 298-300. Rademacher also discusses the possibility that a nonpracticing
entity that merely licenses its patent would not be viewed as "practicing" the invention and there-
fore might be vulnerable to compulsory licensing under article 83 of the Japanese Patent Act; un-
like article 93 of that act, which also permits compulsory licensing under some circumstances, arti-
cle 83 does not require a showing that the license is necessary to serve the public interest. See
Rademacher, supra, at 344-46. Apparently there are no cases applying this provision, though.
7 See Wu Chengjian & Zhang Xiao, On Injunctive Relief for Standard-Essential Patents, CINA
PATS. & TRADEMARKS, No. 2, 2013, at 27-28.
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nese courts view themselves as having some discretion to deny injunctive relief in
appropriate cases.74
C. Competition Law
1. U.S. Law
In two cases resolved within the last year, the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) has invoked competition law as a basis for limiting a patent owner's ability
to seek injunctive relief for the infringement of SEPs.75 In the first case, In the Mat-
ter of Robert Bosch GmbH, the FTC complaint alleged (1) that Bosch's proposed
acquisition of SPX Service Solutions (SPX) would violate § 7 of the Clayton Act
and § 5 of the FTC Act by tending to monopolize the market for air conditioning
recovery, recycling, and recharging (ACRRR) systems used for the repair of motor
vehicle air conditioning (MVAC) systems; and (2) that SPX's conduct of seeking
injunctive relief in an action for the infringement of two patents that may have been
essential to the practice of the J-2788 and J-2843 standards promulgated by SAE In-
ternational (an SSO that develops standards to ensure that ACRRR systems comply
with U.S. Environmental Protection Agency regulations), despite its having provid-
ed a Letter of Assurance to SAE that it would license those patents on FRAND
74 See COTTER, supra note 6, at 349-50 and sources cited therein.
75 The FTC is a federal agency charged with investigating, prosecuting, and adjudicating violations
of § 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1), which proscribes "Unfair methods of competition in
or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." The
Commission shares authority with the Department of Justice to challenge allegedly anticompetitive
practices as unfair methods of competition. For the most part, these practices coincide with prac-
tices that violate the Sherman or Clayton Acts, although the Commission "retains some authority
to define as 'unfair methods of competition' certain practices that do not violate the other antitrust
laws." BARTON BEEBE ET AL., TRADEMARKS, UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND BUSINESS TORTS 370
(2011) (citing FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239-40 (1972), and Negotiated Da-
ta Solutions LLC, Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, 73 Fed. Reg.
5846-01, at 5848-49 (Jan. 31, 2008)). The FTC also may challenge practices such as false adver-
tising or other deceptive conduct injurious to consumers as "unfair" or "deceptive" trade practices.
See id. As was the case in the two matters discussed in the text above, following an investigation
the Commission may, by majority vote of the five commissioners, present a party believed to be in
violation of the Act with a draft complaint and proposed consent order, which the party either may
accept (subject to a period for public commentary before entry) or reject. If the party rejects the
consent order, the matter proceeds to trial before an administrative law judge, whose findings of
fact and conclusions of law are subject to appeal to the Commission. The Commission's decision
on appeal may then be appealed to a federal appellate court. Alternatively, if a party rejects a con-
sent order, the FTC may proceed directly to federal district court for preliminary relief, pursuant to
FTC Act § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). See BEEBE ET AL., supra, at 371, n.14.
I should emphasize that the two cases discussed in the text above are notable because the FTC
specifically alleged that the act of seeking an injunction for the infringement of a FRAND-
encumbered SEP could be a violation of the FTC Act. This goes beyond merely requiring a merg-
ing entity to license certain patents to competitors, as a condition of allowing what otherwise might
be an anticompetitive merger to go forward. See, e.g. Fed. Trade Comm'n, Press Release, FTC
Puts Conditions on Honeywell's Acquisition of Scan Engine Manufacturer Intermec: Settlement
Preserves Competition by Requiring Honeywell to License Key Scanner Patents, Sept. 13, 2013,
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2013/09/honeywell.shtm.
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terms, constituted an unfair method of competition in violation of FTC Act § 5.6 In
April 2013 the FTC entered a consent order requiring Bosch, among other things, to
(1) license certain enumerated patents, including the patents at issue in the SPX
lawsuit, on a royalty-free basis; (2) license any other patents it might thereafter ac-
quire that are essential to the practice of the J-2788 and J-2843 standards on
FRAND terms; and (3) not to seek injunctive relief for the infringement of any of
these patents.
The Commission explained its reasoning with regard to the SEP portion of the
consent order in an accompanying Statement. First, the Commission asserted, the
act of seeking injunctive relief for the infringement of a FRAND-encumbered SEP
"has the potential to cause substantial harm to U.S. competition, consumers, and in-
novation," because the SEP owner can demand royalties "that reflect the invest-
ments firms make to develop and implement the standard, rather than the economic
value of the technology itself," thus potentially harming "incentives to develop
standard-compliant products" and leading "to excessive royalties that can be passed
along to consumers in the form of higher prices. " Second, given this potential
harm to competition, the Commission concluded that, in the present case, it would
be fair to characterize the seeking of injunctive relief for the infringement of a
FRAND-encumbered SEP as an unfair method of competition, a term that is not
limited to conduct that violates the Sherman or Clayton Acts. 7 9 (Indeed, the Com-
mission asserted that it had "no reason to believe that, in this case, a monopolization
count under the Sherman Act was appropriate."8 0 As we shall see, the Commission
probably was correct to make this concession.) Third, the Commission sought to
limit the precedential effect of its order to some degree by noting that "[w]hile not
76 See Complaint, In the Matter of Robert Bosch GmbH, Docket No. C-4377 (FTC Nov. 26, 2012),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210081/121126boschcmpt.pdf.
n See Decision and Order (Redacted Public Version), In the Matter ofRobert Bosch GmbH, Docket
No. C-4377, §§ II.B.2, IV (FTC Apr. 24, 2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist
/1210081/130424robertboschdo.pdf; Analysis of Agreement Containing Consent Orders to Aid
Public Comment, In the Matter of Robert Bosch GmbH, Docket No. C-4377, at 5, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210081/121126boschanalysis.pdf
78 Statement of the Federal Trade Commission, In the Matter of Robert Bosch GmbH, FTC File No.
121-0081, at 1-2, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210081/121126boschcomm
issionstatement.pdf (quoting Third Party United States Federal Trade Commission's Statement on
the Public Interest filed on June 6, 2012 in In re Certain Wireless Communication Devices, Porta-
ble Music & Data Processing Devices, Computers and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-
745, available at www.ftc.gov/os/2012/06/1206ftcwirelesscom.pdf, and in In re Certain Gaming
and Entertainment Consoles, Related Software, and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-752,
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/06/1206ftcgamingconsole.pdf). The Commission also
perceived "a tension between offering a FRAND commitment and seeking injunctive relief" Id.
at 2.
79 Statement of the Federal Trade Commission, In the Matter of Robert Bosch GmbH, FTC File No.
121-0081, at 3, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210081/121126boschcomm
issionstatement.pdf ("The plain language of Section 5, the relevant legislative history, and a long
line of Supreme Court cases all affirm that Section 5 extends beyond the Sherman Act.").
80 Id. at 2, n.7.
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every breach of a FRAND licensing obligation will give rise to Section 5 concerns,
when such a breach tends to undermine the standard-setting process and risks harm-
ing American consumers, the public interest demands action. . . ."" Commission-
ers Ohlhausen and Rosch both supported the Commission's decision to challenge
Bosch's acquisition of SPX, but dissented from the portion of the order relating to
SEPs.82
The more prominent case, however, was the second one, In the Matter of
Motorola Mobility LLC and Google Inc.83  By way of background, in February
2012, the United States Department of Justice approved Google's acquisition of
Motorola Mobility, which owned a portfolio of over 17,000 patents.84 The transac-
' Id. at 8.
82 See Statement of Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen, In the Matter of Robert Bosch GmbH,
File No. 121-0081, Docket No. C-4377, at 1, 4, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210081/121126boschohlhausenstatement.pdf:
Even if all of the SEP-related allegations in the complaint were proved . . . I
would not view such conduct as violating Section 5 of the FTC Act. Simply seek-
ing injunctive relief on a patent subject to a fair, reasonable, and non-
discriminatory ("FRAND") license, without more, even if seeking such relief
could be construed as a breach of a licensing commitment, should not be deemed
either an unfair method of competition or an unfair act or practice under Section
5 ...
Before invoking Section 5 to address business conduct not already covered by the
antitrust laws ... the Commission should fully articulate its views about what con-
stitutes an unfair method of competition, including the general parameters of unfair
conduct and where Section 5 overlaps and does not overlap with the antitrust laws,
and how the Commission will exercise its enforcement discretion under Section 5.
Otherwise, the Commission runs a serious risk of failure in the courts and a possi-
ble hostile legislative reaction, both of which have accompanied previous FTC at-
tempts to use Section 5 more expansively.
See also FTC Order Restores Competition in US. Market for Equipment Used to Recharge Vehicle
Air Conditioning Systems (Nov. 26, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012
/1 1/bosch.shtm (noting that Commissioner Rosch also voted against the Commission order).
83 See Decision and Order, In the Matter of Motorola Mobility LLC and Google Inc., (FTC July 24,
2013), available at http://ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210120/130724googlemotorolado.pdf.
84 See Statement of the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division on Its Decision to Close Its Inves-
tigations of Google Inc.'s Acquisition of Motorola Mobility Holdings Inc. and the Acquisitions of
Certain Patents by Apple Inc., Microsoft Corp. and Research in Motion Ltd., DOJ OFFICE OF
PUBLIC AFFAIRS (Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 13, 2012, available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/February/12-at-210.html. The Statement notes:
During the course of the division's investigation, several of the principal competi-
tors, including Google, Apple and Microsoft, made commitments concerning their
SEP licensing policies. The division's concerns about the potential anticompeti-
tive use of SEPs was lessened by the clear commitments by Apple and Microsoft
to license SEPs on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, as well as their
commitments not to seek injunctions in disputes involving SEPs. Google's com-
mitments were more ambiguous and do not provide the same direct confirmation
of its SEP licensing policies.
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tion closed in May 2012.85 Shortly thereafter, however, the FTC formally launched
its own investigation into Google/Motorola Mobility's conduct with regard to
SEPs.86 The initial version of the FTC's complaint alleged that Google and
Motorola Mobility violated § 5 by engaging in unfair methods of competition and
unfair acts or practices" by seeking injunctive relief for the infringement of
FRAND-encumbered SEPs in federal district court and before the ITC."8 The par-
ties agreed to a consent order under which Google and Motorola Mobility agreed
not to seek injunctive relief for the infringement of these SEPs, subject to some ex-
ceptions. 89 In its accompanying Statement, the Commission asserted that, as in
Bosch, "a breach of a FRAND commitment in the context of standard setting poses
serious risks to the standard-setting process, competition, and consumers," and
again reiterated that it was not alleging a violation of the Sherman or Clayton
Acts.90 In July 2013, the Commission published the final version of the consent or-
der and the final version of the complaint. The latter had been amended to delete
8 See Jenna Wortham, Google Closes $12.5 Billion Deal to Buy Motorola Mobility, N.Y. TIMES
(May 22, 2012), available at http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/22/google-closes-12-5-billion-
deal-to-buy-motorola-mobility/.
86 See Sara Forden, Google Said to Face U.S. Probe Over Motorola Patents, BLOOMBERG NEWS
(June 29, 2012), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-29/google-said-to-face-u-
s-probe-over-motorola-patents.html.
87 The "unfair trade practices" branch of FTC practice more typically addresses consumer protection
rather than antitrust-related matters. For discussion, see BEEBE ET AL., supra note 75, at 370, 399-
401. In Bosch, the Commission had "reserved for another day the question whether, and under
what circumstances, similar conduct might also be challenged as an unfair act or practice...."
Statement of the Federal Trade Commission, In the Matter of Robert Bosch GmbH,
FTC File No. 121-0081, at 2 n.7, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210081
/121126boschcommissionstatement.pdf.
88 Complaint, In the Matter of Motorola Mobility LLC and Google Inc., No. 121-0120, 1,
25-27, 31-32 (FTC Jan. 3, 2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210120
/130103googlemotorolacmpt.pdf.
89 Decision and Order, In the Matter of Motorola Mobility LLC and Google Inc., No. 121-0120, (FTC
July 24, 2013), available at http://ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210120/130724googlemotorolado.pdf
90 See Statement of the Federal Trade Commission, In the Matter of Google Inc., No. 121-0120, at 2-
3 (FTC Jan. 3, 2013) ("A stand-alone Section 5 unfair methods of competition claim allows the
Commission to protect consumers and the standard-setting process while minimizing the often
burdensome combination of class actions and treble damages associated with private antitrust en-
forcement."). Three members of the Commission-Chairman Leibowitz and Commissioners Brill
and Ramirez-were of the view that the facts supported an unfair methods of competition claim.
Id. at 3, n.9. An overlapping but not identical group of three-Chairman Leibowitz and Commis-
sioners Brill and Rosch-were of the view that the facts supported an unfair acts of practices
claim. Id. See also, Separate Statement of Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch Regarding Google's
Standard Essential Patent Enforcement Practices, In the Matter of Google Inc., No. 121-0120 (FTC
Jan. 3, 2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210120/130103googlemot
orolaroschstmt.pdf. Commissioner Ohlhausen dissented with regard to both claims. See Dissent-
ing Statement of Commissioner Maureen K. Ohihausen, In the Matter of Motorola Mobility LLC
and Google Inc., No. 121-0120 (FTC Jan. 3, 2013), available at
http://flc.gov/os/caselist/1 210120/130103googlemotorolaohlhausenstmt.pdf.
330 [Vol. 22:311
2014] Comparative Law and Economics of SEPs and FRAND Royalties
the claim of unfair acts or practices, leaving only the claim for unfair methods of
competition. 9'
Despite the fact that both Bosch and Google were decided just within the last
year, the prospect of the FTC taking a similarly aggressive policy with respect to
FRAND commitments in the near future is unclear. As noted above, both Bosch
and Google were 3-2 decisions in favor of interpreting the unfair methods of com-
petition language of FTC Act § 5 as providing a stand-alone9 2 basis for preventing
the owner of a FRAND-encumbered SEP from seeking injunctive relief. Since
then, Commissioner Rosch-who dissented from the unfair methods of competition
analysis in Bosch and Google, but concurred with the Commission's initial inclina-
tion to allege unfair acts or practices in Google-has stepped down and been re-
placed by Commissioner Wright, who in his public statements has promoted a rela-
tively modest interpretation of both unfair methods of competition9 3 and unfair acts
94
or practices. Chairman Leibowitz also has stepped down and has been replaced as
chair by Commissioner Ramirez. 95 Terrell McSweeny has been nominated for the
vacant seat,9 6 but as of September 2013 has not yet been confirmed, leaving at pre-
91 See Complaint, In the Matter of Motorola Mobility LLC and Google Inc., supra note 88, at 1,
31; see also Letter to Cornmenters, In the Matter of Motorola Mobility LLC and Google Inc., No.
121-0120, Docket No. C-4410 (FTC July 24, 2013), at 2 n.2, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210120/130724googlemotorolaletter.pdf (noting the change).
92 That is, without demonstrating that the conduct also violated the Sherman or Clayton Act.
9 See Statement of Commissioner Joshua D. Wright, Proposed Policy Statement Regarding Unfair
Methods of Competition Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (June 19, 2013),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/wright/130619umcpolicystatement.pdf Commissioner
Wright proposes, among other things, that for the FTC to find an unfair method of competition that
does not violate the Sherman or Clayton Act, the conduct at issue must both harm competition and
offer no cognizable efficiencies. Although he does not indicate how he would have decided Bosch
or Motorola Mobility/Google, the requirement of a complete absence of cognizable efficiencies, as
opposed to a balancing of efficiencies against anticompetitive harms, would seem to result in a
fairly modest construction of unfair methods of competition.
More recently, Commissioner Wright has expressed the view that FRAND commitments should
not be interpreted as contractual obligations to forgo injunctive relief, or as precluding injunctive
relief under the eBay standard; and that antitrust has only a very limited role to play in this space as
well. See Remarks of Joshua D. Wright, Commissioner, SSOs, FRAND, and Antitrust: Lessons
from the Economics of Incomplete Contracts (Sept. 12, 2013), available at
http://www.fic.gov/speeches/wright/130912cpip.pdf. For my initial thoughts on Commissioner
Wright's remarks, see Thomas F. Cotter, Wright on Standard-Essential Patents and FRAND,
COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES (Sept. 13, 2013, 1:51 PM), available at
http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2013/09/wright-on-standard-essential-patents.html.
94 See Joshua D. Wright & Audrey N. Stuempfle, Patent Holdup, Antitrust, and Innovation: Harness
or Noose?, 61 ALA. L. REV. 559, 566 (2010) (book review of MICHAEL A. CARRIER, INNOVATION
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: HARNESSING THE POWER OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST
LAW (2009) (casting doubt on the FTC's unfair acts or practices authority as a tool for remedying
alleged patent holdup)).
9 Erin Coe, Obama Taps DOJ's McSweeny for FTC Seat, LAw360 (June 21, 2013), available at
http://www.1aw360.com/articles/452356/obama-taps-doj-s-mosweeny-for-ftc-seat.
96 Id. A confirmation hearing was held before the Senate Commerce Committee on September 18,
2013. Alex Zank, U.S. Senate Committee Reviews FTC Nomination, THE BLT: BLOG OF LEGAL
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sent only four active commissioners, two of whom I predict would not vote in favor
of another consent order like the ones in Bosch and Google. McSweeny's views
are, to my knowledge, not publicly known.
In any event, aside from possible FTC intervention in cases such as Bosch and
Google, the role of U.S. antitrust law as a means for enforcing FRAND commit-
ments seems quite limited. The basis for an antitrust claim would have to be that,
by seeking an injunction or otherwise holding out for higher royalties, an SEP own-
er somehow violates Sherman Act § 2, which condemns monopolization and at-
tempts to monopolize.97 U.S. law generally doesn't condemn excessive pricing in
and of itself, however, so the only way for such a claim to work would be to charac-
terize the SEP owner's conduct as an actionable refusal to deal or as involving ac-
tionably deceptive conduct. In the present context, neither theory seems to hold
much promise.98
TIMES (Sept. 19, 2013, 3:27 PM), available at http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2013/09/us-senate-
committee-reviews-ftc-nomination.html.
9' See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2004) ("[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felo-
ny . . . ."). Of course, if an SSO, through certain of its members, were to agree to disadvantage or
exclude another member or potential member, the agreement may be actionable under Sherman
Act § 1. See, e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988); Am.
Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982); Radiant Burners, Inc. v.
Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961) (per curiam). Whether an SSO should be lia-
ble for failing to prevent one or more of its members from engaging in FRAND abuse-that is, for
failing to institute policies that would prevent members from exploiting the ex post market power
conferred by the incorporation of their technology into a standard-was a point of discussion dur-
ing the University of Florida workshop. See Thomas F. Cotter, Day 2 of University of Florida
Workshop on Standard Essential Patents and FRAND: Page on "Judging Monopolistic Pricing:
F/RAND and Antitrust Injury, " COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES (Sept. 12, 2013,
8:15 AM), available at http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2013/09/day-2-of-
university-of-florida-workshop_12.html; see also Trueposition, Inc. v. LM Ericsson Tel. Co., 899
F. Supp. 2d 356, 364-66 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (denying an SSO's motion to dismiss an antitrust claim
which, according to the SSO, alleged only that the SSO failed to prevent its members from exclud-
ing the plaintiff's technology from the standard, on the ground that the complaint also alleged that
the SSO cloaked the members with apparent authority to engage in concerted action).
98 Doctrinally, a § 2 monopolization claim requires proof of are "(1) the possession of monopoly
power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distin-
guished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or
historic accident." United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). The first element
requires evidence of very substantial market power, usually in the range of a 70% or better market
share coupled with substantial barriers to entry. See, e.g., E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon
Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 451 (4th Cir. 2011) (70% market share); United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (over 95% market share); Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, Inc., 899 F.2d 951, 967-68 (10th Cir. 1990) (up to 60% market share). Proving this ele-
ment may not be terribly difficult in the context of SEPs. If the patent in suit is indeed standard-
essential, it is a fair inference that the ability to exclude firms that sell products that comply with
the standard from practicing the patent would indeed confer substantial market power. Once users
are locked in, the patent owner armed with an injunction can pretty much name its price. Moreo-
ver, the barriers to entry (creating a new standard) would be very high. The more challenging issue
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One possibility would be to try to characterize the act of seeking an injunction
against the unauthorized use of a FRAND-encumbered SEP as an actionable unilat-
eral refusal to deal, but this theory is problematic for several reasons. First, an SEP
owner's refusal to license on terms that the user believes to be FRAND may not be
so unreasonable as to constitute a practical refusal to deal.99 After all, the typical
SEP owner is probably not seeking exclusion, but rather licensing fees. Second,
even if the SEP owner's conduct could be characterized as a refusal to deal, the U.S.
Supreme Court has held that, in general, there is no duty to deal-although in theo-
ry a monopolist may be liable under § 2 if it lacks a legitimate business purpose for
its refusal to deal, for example, if there was a prior course of dealing between the
parties or if the monopolist appears to be forgoing the short-term benefits from con-
tinuing the relationship for the prospect of longer-term gain.100 The Court in Veri-
zon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP nevertheless cau-
tioned against broad interpretations of § 2, on the grounds, among others, that
forced sharing may reduce ex ante incentives to innovate; that courts are not well-
positioned to regulate price and output, in the manner of central planners; and that
forced sharing may encourage collusion between the monopolist and potential com-
petitors. 01
Making things even harder for the antitrust plaintiff is the fact that the antitrust
claim would involve a unilateral refusal to deal in IP, which is even less likely to
violate § 2 under U.S. law. Although the different circuits have articulated different
standards for assessing liability in such cases, there is a widespread consensus that
there is a presumptively legitimate business justification for an IP owner's refusal to
license. Under one approach, the presumption can be rebutted only in rare circum-
would be to satisfy element (2), which normally entails proof of some sort of predatory or exclu-
sionary conduct that lacks a procompetitive justification. See, e.g., LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 277 F.3d
365, 381 n.11 (3d Cir. 2002) reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated (Feb. 25, 2002), on reh'g en
banc, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003); Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 358. Although refusals to deal and de-
ceptive conduct sometimes may fit the bill, as discussed above the chances of prevailing in the
context under discussion seems weak. Similarly, an attempted monopolization claim requires
proof of (1) a specific intent to monopolize, (2) predatory or anticompetitive conduct, and (3) a
dangerous probability of success. See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456
(1993). Thus, if the conduct at issue is not actionably predatory or anticompetitive, for the reasons
stated above, there would be no actionable attempted monopolization claim either. The third ele-
ment seems suspect as well if the court is likely to deny an injunction (so there would be no dan-
gerous probability of success) and award damages that might approximate a FRAND royalty.
99 See MetroNet Servs. Corp. v. Qwest Corp., 383 F.3d 1124, 1132 (9th Cir. 2004) ("An offer to deal
with a competitor only on unreasonable terms and conditions can amount to a practical refusal to
deal.").
100 See Verizon Communc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP. 540 U.S. 398, 410 (2004);
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608 (1985). See Novell, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., No. 12-4143, 2013 WL 5303259 (10th Cir. Sept. 23, 2013) for a recent federal
appellate decision adopting a narrow view of the circumstances in which a unilateral refusal to deal
may be actionable.
o See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411-16.
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stances where cooperation is "indispensable to effective competition."l02 That con-
dition seems unlikely to be present in the SEP context, because the market for the
patented technology is not, ex post, competitive. Under another approach, the pre-
sumption can be rebutted by proof that the refusal was a pretext.1 03 This rule has
been criticized for introducing a subjective element into the analysis, 10 4 but even on
its own terms the pretext rationale seems unlikely to be applicable as long as the lit-
igation is not a sham and (unlike in Image Technical)105 the assertion of patent in-
fringement is not a mere afterthought. Finally, under the Federal Circuit's approach
(predicting the law of the Tenth Circuit), the presumption can be rebutted only if the
patentee is enforcing a fraudulently procured patent, or is engaging in sham litiga-
tion, or the refusal is a means for gaining a monopoly beyond the scope of the pa-
tent.106 None of these methods of rebutting the presumption normally would be ap-
plicable; claims of fraud or sham are extremely difficult to prove, and as long as the
patent owner is simply holding out for a better deal the beyond-the-scope rationale
would be extremely difficult to sustain as well.o
A variation on the theme of refusals to deal would be to invoke the "essential
facilities" doctrine, but this doctrine would seem to stand little chance of success
either. To be sure, some courts have recognized a duty on the part of a monopolist
to share a facility that is essential to competition in some market-though the U.S.
Supreme Court in recent years has called the doctrine's existence (and its status as
an independent ground for antitrust liability) into question.'os Under one formula-
tion of the doctrine, the plaintiff must prove four elements "(1) control of the essen-
tial facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor's inability practically or reasonably to
duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of the facility to a competi-
tor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility." 109 As above, however, one
problem would be proving that the SEP owner is, in fact, denying use of the "facili-
ty" to a competitor, as opposed to merely holding out for a better price. Moreover,
102 Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187, n.64 (1st Cir. 1994) abro-
gatedby ReedElsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 176 L. Ed. 2d 18 (2010).
103 Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1218-20 (9th Cir. 1997).
104 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Unilateral Refusals to License in the US, in ANTITRUST,
PATENTS AND COPYRIGHT: EU AND US PERSPECTIVES 12 (Howard Shelanski & Frangois L6v6que
eds., 2005).
1o5 See Image Technical Servs., 125 F.3d at 1219 ("Kodak's parts manager testified that patents 'did
not cross [his] mind' at the time Kodak began the parts policy" that formed the basis of the plain-
tiffs' antitrust claim).
106 See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig. CSU, L.L.C., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325-28 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
107 Causation might be yet another problem. Even if the SEP owner's conduct could be viewed as
willful or exclusionary, it's not at all clear that one single lawsuit against one single firm would
contribute much to the owner's acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power in the market oc-
cupied by the patent, particularly if the SEP by itself confers monopoly power in a properly-
defined market.
108 See Thomas F. Cotter, The Essential Facilities Doctrine, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 157,
161 (Keith Hylton ed., 2010).
109 MCI Comm'n Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983).
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in addition to the four elements just listed courts often require evidence that the de-
fendant operates in both an upstream and a downstream market, and that the de-
fendant is excluding competition in one or the other by refusing access. 0 Addi-
tionally, in Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., the Federal Circuit held that the doctrine
does not apply unless both plaintiff and defendant are competitors."' Unless these
additional factors were met, the doctrine would have little chance of success; and
even aside from these problems, the courts' general disapproval of unilateral refusal
to deal with theories involving intellectual property rights would lead me to con-
clude that, as a practical matter, the essential facilities doctrine has little likelihood
of success in the present context.
Leaving refusal to deal theories behind, a second possibility might be to try to
characterize the SEP owner's conduct-either the seeking of an injunction, or pos-
sibly even the holding out for a supra-FRAND royalty-not as a refusal to license
but rather as reneging on the commitment to license on FRAND terms. Assuming,
for the sake of argument, that the antitrust plaintiff can prove that the terms offered
by the SEP owner were not FRAND (a major though not insurmountable hurdle in
and of itself, as discussed in Part IV below), doctrinally the question would be
whether the breach of the FRAND commitment is the sort of "willful" conduct that
§ 2 condemns. The closest precedents to date are the cases addressing whether de-
ceptive conduct before an SSO can constitute a § 2 violation; the two leading deci-
sions are the Third Circuit's opinion in Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc.I12 and
the D.C. Circuit's decision in Rambus v. FTC.'"3 In Broadcom, the Third Circuit
held that deceptive conduct that resulted in an SSO's choice of a standard that oth-
erwise would have been rejected can violate § 2.' 14 But the D.C. Circuit in Rambus
held that it is not a § 2 violation if, absent the deception, the SSO would have cho-
sen the same or another proprietary standard, and all the plaintiff is complaining
about is that (but for the deception) it would have negotiated a better deal."' In ef-
fect, the court distinguished between monopoly acquisition or expansion, which
might be actionable, and monopoly exploitation on the part of a lawful monopolist,
which the court believed is not."'6 The Rambus decision has been criticized for not
recognizing as a cognizable harm the injury to consumers resulting from a lawful
monopolist's exercise of monopoly power that would have been constrained absent
10 Cotter, supra note 108, at 161-62.
1 Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
112 Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2007). For discussion of other cases in
a similar vein, including Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to
Aid Public Comment, 73 Fed. Reg. 5846-01 (Jan. 31, 2008); In Re Union Oil Co.,
No. 9305, (F.T.C. July 6, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9305
/040706commissionopinion.pdf; and In Re Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996), see
Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151,
1188-90 (2009).
1" Rambus, Inc. v. Fed Trade Comm'n, 522 F.3d 456,459 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
114 See Broadcom, 501 F.3d at 313-14.
115 See Rambus, 522 F.3d at 463-67.
"' See id. at 466-67.
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the monopolist's deceptive conduct.' 7 But even if other courts were to reject Ram-
bus on this ground, a claim premised on the deceptive conduct theory would have to
show that the SEP owner engaged in some form of deceptive conduct before the
standard was adopted. This would be problematic if the SEP owner only declared
its patent standard-essential and made the FRAND commitment after the standard
was adopted, which (as I understand it) is the more typical sequence of events.
Even under Broadcom, the antitrust plaintiff arguably would have to show that, but
for the deception, the SSO would have chosen a different standard." 8 The theory
seems to be too much of a stretch.
Yet another issue common to any of the above theories is the possibility that
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine would preclude any antitrust claim premised on the
SEP owner's assertion of valid patent rights. Generally speaking, the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine recognizes an immunity for conduct that amounts to petition-
ing the government; to overcome the immunity, the antitrust plaintiff asserting that
the defendant violated the antitrust laws by engaging in or threatening sham in-
fringement litigation must prove that the infringement claim was both objectively
and subjectively unreasonable." 9 Whether the Noerr-Pennington doctrine immun-
izes an SEP owner from antitrust liability that otherwise might arise from asserting
a right to injunctive relief is, at present, an open question.120  In the Apple v.
Motorola case referenced above, Judge Crabb concluded that Noerr-Pennington
immunized Motorola from antitrust liability arising from its having initiated a pro-
ceeding before the ITC.121 By contrast, in its actions relating to Robert Bosch, the
FTC rejected the argument that "imposing [FTC Act] Section 5 liability where a
SEP holder violates its commitment to license its SEPs on fair, reasonable, and non-
discriminatory ("FRAND") terms offends the First Amendment," on the ground that
the SEP owner who has made a FRAND commitment has, in effect, agreed to give
117 See, e.g., Cotter, supra note 112, at 1196-99. The case was handled quite differently in Europe.
See Memorandum, European Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission Confirms Sending a Statement of
Objections to Rambus (Aug. 23, 2007), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseMEMO-07-
330 en.htm. Rambus subsequently settled the European action. For discussion, see, e.g., Babey &
Rizvi, supra note 61, at 815.
Is See Commission Opinion, In the Matter of Certain Electronic Devices, Inv. No. 337-TA-794,
USITC Pub. slip op. at 64-66 (July 5, 2013) (rejecting Apple's argument that Samsung had en-
gaged in actionably deceptive conduct by failing to timely disclose the relevant patents to the
SSO).
119 See Prof I Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1993).
See also C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing Handgards,
Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 743 F.2d 1282, 1288, (9th Cir. 1984) for the proposition that "the claimant
must show 'some abuse of process,"' i.e., "clear and convincing evidence of bad faith").
120 See Thomas Dillickrath & David Emanuelson, Injunctive Relief and the Noerr-Pennington Doc-
trine: The Search for Clarity on a Muddied Pitch, CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE (Mar. 2013).
121 See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1075-77 (W.D. Wis. 2012)
("Apple's antitrust claim is premised on Motorola's attempt to enforce its patents. Because
Motorola's enforcement of its patents is privileged conduct protected by the First Amendment, the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine applies.").
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up its right to seek injunctive relief.122 My own, somewhat preliminary, view is that
Noerr-Pennington should not apply because the antitrust claim is premised not on
the assertion of patent rights generally but rather on the patentee's request for a spe-
cific remedy-injunctive relief. (I admit that I am not aware of any cases making
this distinction between rights and remedies in the Noerr-Pennington context, how-
ever.) Nevertheless, if my analysis of the substantive antitrust issues above is cor-
rect, whether Noerr-Pennington immunity applies or not may be something of a
moot point.
2. Europe
In Europe, by contrast, competition law may come to play a larger role than
patent law in forcing SEP owners to license their patents on FRAND terms. So far,
however, the signals are mixed, and the matter probably will not be resolved until
an expected ruling by the Court of Justice for the European Union (CJEU) in
2013.123
At issue in Europe is the application of article 102 of the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union (TFEU). In relevant part, this article states:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market
or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in
so far as it may affect trade between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading
conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties,
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
122 See Response to Commenters, In the Matter of Robert Bosch GmbH, File No. 121-0081, No. C-
4377, F.T.C. Wash, 20580, at 1-2, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210081
/130424robertboschltr.pdf; Statement of the Federal Trade Commission, In the Matter of Google
Inc., F.T.C. File No. 121-0120, at 5 n.15 (Jan. 3, 2013), available at
http://ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210120/130103googlemotorolastmtofcomm.pdf. Commissioner Ohlhau-
sen dissented from both statements. See Statement of Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen, In
the Matter of Robert Bosch GmbH, File No. 121-0081, No. C-4377, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210081/121126boschohlhausenstatement.pdf; Dissenting State-
ment of Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen, In the Matter of Motorola Mobility LLC and
Google Inc., File No. 121-0120, available at http://ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210120/130103googlemot
orolaohlhausenstmt.pdf.
123 See, e.g., Seoul District Court [Dist. Ct.], 2011 Kahap39552, Aug. 24, 2012 (S. Kor.) (holding that
Samsung had market power in 3GPP market technology, and that its SEPs could be considered es-
sential facilities, but nevertheless rejecting all of Apple's antitrust claims, concluding that Samsung
lacked any intent or purpose to expand its monopoly power or to disturb the market's free competi-
tion by artificially manipulating the fair market discipline). I gather that the issue also may have
arisen in the Chinese Huawei v. InterDigital case, see supra note 29, which has yet to be pub-
lished. Because I have less information on the specifics of the antitrust issues raised in these two
cases, for now I will confine my discussion to Europe.
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(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of sup-
plementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no
124
connection with the subject of such contracts.
In practice, antitrust enforcers within the EU do not frequently invoke article 102 to
regulate prices or to penalize price discrimination absent some evidence of competi-
tive disadvantage or segmentation of the common market.12 5 In the present context,
however, both the courts and the European Commission have indicated that a re-
fusal to conclude a license on FRAND terms can, under some circumstances,
amount to an abuse of dominant position. Nevertheless, as discussed below, for
now they are not of one mind as to what those conditions are.
To date, the most important body of case law on the topic has come from Ger-
many.126 The leading case is a 2009 decision of the Bundesgerichtshof (German
Federal Supreme Court, or BGH for short) in a patent infringement case brought by
Philips against Master & More involving a patent that was essential to the Orange
Book Standard used for recordable and rewritable compact disc technology. 12 7 In
124 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 102, Mar. 30,
2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47, 89 art. 102 (2010). Note that, although article 102 is, more or less, the
counterpart of Sherman Act § 2, unlike that statute, article 102 does not, on its face, condemn the
acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power. See Einer Elhauge, Disgorgement as an Antitrust
Remedy, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 79, 89-92 (2009).
125 See, e.g., ALISON JONES & BRENDA SUFRIN, EU COMPETITION LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS
531-48 (4th ed. 2010).
126 The two Dutch decisions referenced earlier both touch on the issue. See Rb's-Gravenhage 17
Maart 2010, Nos. 08-2522, 08-2524 m.nt. 6.20-25 (Koninlijke Philips Elecs. N.V./SK Kasset-
ten GmbH), available at http://www.eplawpatentblog.com/eplaw/2010/03/nl-philips-v-sk-kasetten-
frand.html (rejecting the argument that Philips had abused its monopoly position by enforcing its
SEP against SK and characterized the German Orange-Book-Standard defense as "fl[ying]in the
face of patent law."). In the more recent Samsung v. Apple case, however, in which the court held
that Samsung had abused its rights by not negotiating in good faith, the court declined to determine
whether Samsung also violated Dutch or E.U. competition law. See Rb's-Gravenhagel4 Maart
2012, Nos. 11-2212, 11-2213, 11-2215 m.nt. 4.42 (Samsung Elecs. Co./Apple Inc.), available at
http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2012:BV8871 (holding that
no decision needs to be made on whether this set of claims also can be regarded as an abuse of dis-
cretion); Accord Korber, supra note 29, at 741 n.58 (stating that the court left the competition law
issue open). Karl notes that in the earlier case the defendant had not applied to the SEP owner for
a license. See Karl, supra note 29, at 6.
127 Although German judicial opinions omit the parties' names, those names are sometimes discerni-
ble from other sources. See Karl, supra note 29, at 9 (identifying the parties to the Orange-Book-
Standard case). In one earlier case, the BGH had recognized that an infringement defendant could
assert a competition-law counterclaim. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice]
July 13, 2004, GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 966, 2004 (Ger.),
translated in 36 INT'L REv. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 741 (2005). In that case, the defend-
ant asserted that the plaintiff, which had granted royalty-free licenses to three other companies
(and paid licenses to others), violated an anti-discrimination provision of German competition law
by refusing to grant the defendant a royalty-free license. See id. at 742, 745, 748-49 (concluding
that it could not be ruled out that the plaintiff was in breach of this provision, the court remanded
for further determination whether the defendant was entitled to a royalty-free license or, if not, to a
license on terms similar to those granted to the recipients of the paid licenses). The defendant had
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its defense, Master & More asserted that Philips had refused to license on fair, rea-
sonable and nondiscriminatory terms and therefore was in violation of what is now
article 102. Philips, however, was not subject to any sort of SSO-based FRAND
obligation, as are the parties in some of the recent cases. As a result, Master &
More argued that the court should refuse to grant Philips its requested injunction
under the legal principle of dolo petit, qui petit quod statim redditurus est.12 8
The BGH agreed that competition law sometimes could preclude a patent own-
er from obtaining an injunction, but that for the asserted defense-now sometimes
referred to as the Zwangslizenzeinwand (compulsory license objection), or more
commonly as the Orange-Book-Standard defense-to succeed, the defendant must
prove two conditions. The first is that it "made an offer, ready for acceptance, on
contractual conditions, which the patent holder cannot refuse without thereby treat-
ing the party seeking a license unequally without good cause as compared with sim-
ilar enterprises or impeding him inequitably" in violation of applicable competition
law, which forbids a "market-dominant patent holder" from abusing its market-
dominant position by refusing "to conclude a contract offered to him on non-
obstructive and non-discriminatory terms." Second, the infringer must "behave[ ]
as if the patent holder had already accepted his offer" by paying "the consideration
that the licensee would be obliged to pay according to a non-discriminatory or non-
obstructive license contract."l 2 9 The prospective licensee may satisfy the second
condition by paying the appropriate license fee into an escrow account, or if the
amount is not easily determined, by paying into the account an amount that exceeds
his own estimate of a FRAND royalty and offering to accept a license that the licen-
sor will set on equitable terms (nach billiger Ermessen).13 0 If the licensee subse-
quently believes that the licensor has set terms that are not fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory, the licensee may petition the court for redress.' 31 On the facts of the
previously agreed to an injunction, so the only matters before the court was the questions of dam-
ages. Id at 742-49.
128 See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] May 6, 2009, GEWERBLICHER
RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 747 (749), 2009 (Ger.), translated in 41 INT'L REV.
INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 369 (2010). The Latin maxim-sometimes phrased in the alter-
native as "Dolo agit, qui petit quod statim redditurus est"-means "He petitions (or, in the alterna-
tive formulation, acts) deceptively, who seeks that which must be immediately returned". In the
present context, the meaning would appear to be that "the patentee, who nevertheless refuses to
grant a license, would act with unclean hands when seeking protection, because he would claim
what he has to immediately return to the defendant." See Hanns Ulrich, Patents and Standards: A
Comment on the German Federal Supreme Court Decision Orange Book Standard, 41 INT'L REV.
INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 337, 342-43 (2010) ( "in purely dogmatic terms, this is no per-
fectly clean construction of the" dolo agit rule).
129 GRUR 747 (749) (Ger.), translated in 41 INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 369, 372.
130 Id. at 750, translated in 41 International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law
369, 374-75.
131 Id. See also Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe [OLGI [Higher Regional Court], GEWERBLICHER
RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 736, 738, 2012 (Ger.); Karl, supra note 28, at 20-23.
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case, however, the court concluded that Master & More had failed to satisfy the
necessary conditions for the defense to apply.132
Subsequent cases have shown that the Orange-Book-Standard conditions are
not easy to prove. 133 German courts have held, for example, that Orange-Book-
Standard is not satisfied if the would-be licensee reserves the right to contest in-
fringementl 34 or refuses to agree that, in the event it challenges the patent at issue,
the license will terminate.' 35 Some commentators have criticized this last condition
in particular, on the ground that such commitments effectively insulate weak SEPs
from review.' 36 Others argue that the two conditions are simply too onerous, and
result in practice in patentees being able to extract supra-FRAND royalties. 37
There is reason to believe, however, that dissatisfaction with Orange-Book-
Standard may lead to its modification, as a matter of EU law, in the near future.
First, in December 2012, the European Commission issued a Statement of Objec-
tions'3 1 informing
132 GRUR 747 (751) (Ger.).
133 According to one recent article, so far the defense has succeeded only twice. See Axel Verhauwen,
"Goldener Orange-Book-Standard" am Ende?: Besprechung zu LG Dfisseldorf Beschl. v.
21.3.2013-4 bO /104/12, GRUR, 558, 559 (2013). One of the two cases is discussed infra at note
134; the other is unreported.
134 See Landgericht Mannheim [LG] [Regional Court] Dec. 9, 2011, MITT. HEFT 120 (124), 2012
(Ger.), aff'd Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Jan. 23, 2012, MITT.
HEFT, 127 (129), 2012 (Ger.). The defendant (Apple) subsequently made an unconditional offer,
pursuant to which the plaintiff (Motorola Mobility) could set the royalty nach billiger Ermessen,
subject potentially to judicial review, and the OLG Karlsruhe concluded that this offer satisfied
Orange-Book-Standard and on this basis lifted the preliminary injunction that had been entered
against Apple. See Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe[OLG Karlsruhe] [Higher Regional Court in
Karlsruhe] Feb. 27, 2012, GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR], 736
(738-39), 2012 (Ger.). For further discussion, see Hermann Deichfu8l, Die Rechtsprechung der In-
stanzgerichte zum kartellrechtlichen Zwangslizeneinwand nach "Orange-Book-Standard" WuW,
1156, 1157-60 (2012); MICHAEL FROHLICH, INT'L Assoc. FOR THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROP., 2012 REPORT OF Q222: STANDARDS AND PATENTS, 4-5, available at
https://www.aippi.org/download/commitees/222/Report222Report+Executive+Committee+Meetin
g+Seoul+2012English.pdf; Verhauwen, supra note 133, at 563.
* See GRUR 736 (738) (Ger.); MITT. HEFT 120 (127, 128) (Ger.); DeichfuB, supra note 134, at 1160-
61; Ronny Hauck, Die kartellrechtliche Bewertung von Nichtangriffsverpflichtungen und Sonder-
kiindigungsrechten in Lizenzvertrgen: Neueste Entwicklungen zum Zwangslizenzeinwand seit
"Orange-Book-Standard, " WRP, 673, 675 (2013); Verhauwen, supra note 133, at 564.
136 See Stephan Barthelme8 & Lars-Peter Rudolf, Die "Unbedingtheit" eines Lizenzangebotes als
Voraussetzung des kartellrechtlicher Zwangslizenzeinwands im patentrechtlichten Unterlas-
sungsverfahren, WuW 2013, 116; Philip Cepl & Kai Ruting, Kartellrechtliche Zuldssigkeit von
Nichtangriffsabreden und ihre Priufung im Petentnichtigskeitsverfahren, WRP, 305, 308-09
(2013); Marc Grunwald, Der kartellrechtliche Zwangslizenzeinwand: Muss das Lizenzangebot
einen Kiindigungsvorbehalt fir den Fall enthalten, dass der lizenzsucher das Klagepatent an-
greift?, Mir. HEFT, 492 (2012); Walz, supra note 58, at 726-27.
137 See Ulrich, supra note 128.
138 See Press Release, European Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of Objections to
Samsung on Potential Misuse of Mobile Phone Standard-Essential Patents (Dec. 21, 2012),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-12-1448 en.htm ("[A] Statement of Objections is a formal
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Samsung of its preliminary view that Samsung's seeking of injunctions against Apple in
various Member States on the basis of its mobile phone standard-essential patents
("SEPs") amounts to an abuse of a dominant position prohibited by EU antitrust rules.
While recourse to injunctions is a possible remedy for patent infringements, such conduct
may be abusive where SEPs are concerned and the potential licensee is willing to nevtiate
a license on Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (so-called "FRAND") terms.
Five months later, the Commission issued a similarly-worded Statement of Objec-
tions to Motorola.14 0 In a memorandum concerning the latter Statement of Objec-
tions, the Commission specifically took issue with the condition that the license
could be terminated in the event of a challenge to patent validity.141
Second, partly in reaction to these ongoing developments within the Commis-
sion, in March 2013 a German court in DUsseldorf referred to the CJEU the ques-
tion of whether it is an abuse of dominant position for the owner of an SEP who has
made a FRAND commitment to seek an injunction when the infringer has expressed
its willingness to negotiate a FRAND license.142 This court seemed much more re-
step in Commission investigations. The Commission informs the parties concerned in writing of
the objections raised against them and the parties can reply in writing and request an oral hearing
to present comments. The Commission takes a final decision only after the parties have exercised
their rights of defence.").
139 id
140 See Press Release, European Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of Objections to
Motorola Mobility on Potential Misuse of Mobile Phone Standard-Essential Patents (May 6, 2013),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-13-406_en.htm.
141 See Memorandum, European Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of Objections to
Motorola Mobility on Potential Misuse of Mobile Phone Standard-Essential Patents-Questions
and Answers (May 6, 2013), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseMEMO-13-
403_en.htm ("[I]n the Commission's preliminary view, the fact that the potential licensee chal-
lenges the validity, essentiality or infringement of the SEP does not make it unwilling where it oth-
erwise agrees to be bound by the determination of FRAND terms by a third party. In the case at
hand, Motorola required clauses that prohibited such challenges by Apple, even after Apple had
agreed to be bound by a third party determination of the FRAND terms. The Commission's prelim-
inary view is that it is in the public interest that licensees should be able to challenge the validity,
essentiality or infringement of SEPs.").
142 See Landgericht Diisseldorf [LG] [Regional Court] Mar. 21, 2013, GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ
UND URHEBERRECHT-RECHTSPECHUNGS-REPORT [GRUR-RR] 196, 2013 (Ger.). The specific ques-
tions presented (in English translation by Florian Mueller) are the following:
1. Does an SEP owner who declared himself willing, vis-i-vis a standard-setting organization,
to grant a license to all comers on FRAND terms, abuse his dominant market position if he
seeks injunctive relief from a court of law against a patent infringer despite the infringer hav-
ing declared himself willing to negotiate such a license, or is it a requirement for the pre-
sumption of abusive conduct that the infringer has made a binding offer to the SEP owner on
terms that the SEP owner cannot refuse without treating the infringer unfairly or discrimina-
torily and [furthermore require that] the infringer, in anticipation of the license he is seeking
already complies with his contractual obligations with respect to past acts of infringement?
2. In the event that a presumption of abuse of a dominant market position may already result
from the infringer's willingness to negotiate:
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ceptive to the argument that the defense should not be conditioned on the licensee's
agreement to a termination clause that would be triggered in the event of a validity
challenge. 143
III. Policy Considerations
In this Part, I present my analysis of the policy considerations that ought to in-
form the discussion of (1) whether, or when, injunctions are preferable to ongoing
damages as a remedy for patent infringement; and (2) what body of law courts and
other policymakers should apply to attain the desired outcome. First, I will argue
that, in the context of SEPs, the presumptive rule should be that the patent owner
Does Art. 102 TFEU involve specific requirements for said willingness to ne-
gotiate in substantive and/or chronological terms? Can such a presumption be
based merely on the infringer's (oral) declaration in broad and general terms of
his willingness to enter into negotiations or does such a presumption require
that the infringer has indeed entered into negotiations, such as by, for example,
communicating terms and conditions under which he is prepared to conclude a
license agreement?
3. In the event that the [infringer's] submission of a binding offer to conclude a license agree-
ment is a requirement for an abuse of a dominant market position:
Does Art. 102 TFEU involve specific substantive and/or chronological re-
quirements with respect to such an offer? Does the offer have to set forth all of
the commercial terms that in accordance with relevant industry practice are
usually set forth in such license agreements? Can the offer be conditioned upon
actual use and/or validity of the SEP-in-suit?
4. In the event that the infringer's [precontractual] fulfillment of obligations arising from the
requested license is a requirement for an abuse of a dominant market position:
Does Art. 102 TFEU involve particular requirements with respect to such acts
of fulfillment? Is the infringer required, in particular, to make disclosures relat-
ing to past acts of infringement and/or to pay [precontractual] royalties? Can
an obligation to pay [precontractual] royalties also be fulfilled by giving secu-
rity?
5. Do the requirements for the presumption of abuse of a dominant market position by an SEP
holder also apply to other remedies for patent infringement (disclosures relating to past in-
fringement, recall [of infringing products from distribution channels], damages)?
Florian Mueller, German Court Refers Huawei-ZTE Standard-Essential Patent Case to Europe's
Highest Court, Foss PATENTS (Mar. 21, 2013, 3:40 PM), available at http://www.fosspatents
.com/2013/03/german-court-refers-huawei-zte-standard.html. Mueller reports that the parties to
the dispute are Huawei and ZTE. Id. See also Daniel Hoppe-Janisch, Der Vorlagebeschluss des
LG Disseldorf "LTE Standard" MIrr. HEFT., 385 (2013) (Ger.), translated in Daniel Hoppe-
Jdnisch, The Landgericht Diisseldorf's (Dfisseldorf District Court) decision to refer "LTE stand-
ard, " WmTE & CASE TECHNOLOGY NEWSFLASH (Aug. 2013), available at
http://www.whitecase.com/articles-08232013/#.Ukrf2z OCW8; Johannes Ztttl & Christian Fulda,
Antitrust Alert: Fast Forward for FRAND Disputes in Europe, JoNESDAY PUBLICATIONS (Apr.
2013), available at http://www.jonesday.com/antitrust-alert-fast-forward-for-frand-disputes-in-
europe-04-11-2013/.
143 See GRUR-RR 196 (199-200) (Ger.) (stating the court gets to the heart of the matter with the sim-
ple words, and there is no interest in the maintenance of an invalid patent).
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may obtain damages only, and that this presumption should apply even when the
patent owner has not made a FRAND commitment. Second, after a brief review of
some contract law issues, I will argue that, in general, the law of patent remedies
has some advantages over competition law as a tool for discriminating between cas-
es in which injunctions are appropriate and cases in which they are not-though, as
always, one must take into account how a proposed change in legal practice would
fit into the web of existing legal assumptions and institutions.
A. Injunctions Versus Damages
I have argued previously that the principal economic justification for awarding
permanent injunctions in patent infringement cases is a matter of information
costs: that is, the assumption that the parties (patentee and prospective user/
infringer) are in a better position than is a court or agency to determine what the pa-
tent is worth, in terms of how much it is likely to contribute to the infringer's ability
to increase profits or reduce costs.144 Thus, when courts award ongoing royalties,
they may generate two costs that otherwise would be avoided: the adjudication costs
incurred as a result of having to litigate the amount of the royalty, above what
would have been incurred if the court had awarded an injunction instead;145 and er-
ror costs resulting from the court setting the amount of the royalty too high or too
low. Those error costs would take the form of either unnecessary deadweight loss,
if the royalty is set higher than what the parties would have agreed to, or the social
costs of whatever consequences follow from setting the royalty too low and thus po-
tentially undermining the patent incentive. We can denote adjudication costs with
the letter A and error costs with the letter E.
On the other hand, there is also a social cost to entering an injunction. One
possible cost is that an injunction will limit access to some product that is necessary
to public health or safety. This cost might justify compulsory licensing in some
cases,146 but I will put that matter to one side and focus instead on the cost that is
144 See, e.g., COTTER, supra note 6, at 53-55. Note that when the prospective user/infringer is a less
efficient (higher-cost) user of the invention than is the patentee, it is not likely that the parties will
reach any agreement permitting the use at issue. The patentee would simply exclude the infringer,
which is the correct outcome assuming that one of the purposes of patent remedies is to preserve
the patent incentive. In such a case, a theoretically adequate alternative to an injunction would be
a court-ordered royalty that would exceed the amount the infringer would be willing to pay. By
contrast, when the infringer is the more efficient party, one would expect the parties to bargain to-
ward a license permitting the use following entry of an injunction, assuming they had not reached
that outcome on their own already. Id. at 44-45.
145 To be sure, there are adjudication costs incident to the fashioning of an appropriate injunction as
well. At least under U.S. law, injunctions are supposed to provide some guidance beyond merely
directing the infringer to stop infringing. For discussion, see John M. Golden, Injunctions as More
(or Less) than "Off Switches": Patent-Infringement Injunctions' Scope , 90 TEX. L. REv. 1399,
1420-24 (2012). And there can be satellite litigation over precisely what an injunction requires.
See, e.g., TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Corp., 646 F.3d 869, 881 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (establishing a
procedure to follow for determining whether a design-around violates an injunction).
146 See COTTER, supra note 6, at 56-57.
343
TEXAS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW JOURNAL
more relevant to SEPs, namely patent holdup. The touchstone of patent holdup is
that the patentee can use an injunction to extract a royalty that reflects not only the
ex ante value of the patent, but also the ex post costs that the infringer would face in
trying to design around (or, to put it another way, some of the value of complemen-
tary technologies with which the patented invention interacts). 4 7 This is a social
cost because it results in greater deadweight loss than is presumptively necessary to
preserve the patent incentive-that is, the patentee winds up getting a royalty that is
higher than the value of the patent's contribution to the state of the art. To be more
precise, I have argued previously that, at least as a first approximation, the law of
remedies should preserve the incentive scheme that is implicit in the granting of pa-
tent rights by rendering the patentee neither better nor worse off than the patentee
would have been but for the infringement.14 8 If a patent is expected to increase a
user's profit by $X over what that profit is expected to be using the next-best avail-
able noninfringing alternative, $X is the maximum royalty the user would pay for
the use of the patent. Where the patent constitutes only a small portion of the value
of an end product and the infringement is inadvertent (as is commonly the case in
the IT sector),149 the amount the patentee can extract ex post-after the user has in-
corporated the patented technology into its products-can be much higher than $X.
The ability of the patent owner to "holdup" the user for a higher royalty potentially
confers a greater degree of market power on the patent owner than is presumptively
necessary to preserve the patent incentive. In addition, because patent holdup raises
the cost to users of patented technology at the margin, it may inhibit some users
from going forward at all. 1o
Proceeding from the above analysis, if we designate the costs arising from pa-
tent holdup as H, courts should award the prevailing patentee a permanent injunc-
tion when A+ E > H, and deny an injunction when A + E < H. But does this theo-
retical analysis have any practical payoff? Although I readily concede that no one
can precisely quantify the relevant variables, I think we can draw some inferences
as to whether A + E is likely to be greater or less than H in a large number of cases.
First, there are likely to be cases where the cost of holdup is small. A principal
example would be when the patentee would not agree to any royalty because the pa-
tentee is the more efficient user, and therefore, prefers exclusion to licensing.'"' In
147 Id. at 58-61.
" Id. at 63-65.
149 See Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1421,
1451-57 (2009) (presenting empirical evidence that independent invention is more common than
copying in the IT sector). I concede that determining exactly what "inadvertence" or "independent
invention" means in the context of patent infringement may not always be easy. But see COTTER,
supra note 6, at 62 n.47.
150 See Cotter, supra note 112, at 1160-71. Granted, a patent owner who is willing to grant nonexclu-
sive licenses may have no interest in discouraging a productive use from occurring at all. When
multiple patent owners all follow the same strategy of trying to extract substantial ex post royalties,
however, there is a risk that "royalty stacking" will have precisely this effect. See id. at 1169-70.
151 See COTTER supra note 6, at 44-45.
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this type of case, there is no holdup because the patentee wants an injunction for the
purpose of exclusion and not as a bargaining chip for the purpose of obtaining a
higher royalty.
Second, although analysts have sometimes assumed that the values of the vari-
ables I refer to as A and E are generally high, 152 that assumption may not always be
accurate. In particular, where the court is awarding past damages that provide a ba-
sis for calculating a future royalty, the additional cost attributable to A may not be
very significant. Much of the work in determining an appropriate royalty base and
rate has already been done. 153
Others might worry that courts are more likely to undervalue than overvalue
patent rights, and that the resulting error costs threaten to undermine the patent in-
centive. Einer Elhauge, for example, argues that damages are likely to be under-
compensatory due to factors such as hindsight bias, difficulties that patent owners
may face in communicating value to juries, and damages estimation techniques that
shortchange accuracy for administrative ease.154 Perhaps Elhauge is right, but his
observations seem rather speculative and (to my mind) do not necessarily support
the undercompensation thesis. Hindsight bias might just as easily lead to overcom-
pensation by leading the trier of fact to conclude that the parties would have accu-
rately predicted the commercial success of the patented invention at the time they
would have been negotiating a royalty; and techniques that privilege ease over accu-
racy might result in discounting the effect of potential noninfringing alternatives in
reducing the value derived from use of the patent. Elhauge also argues that even if
jury awards are on average correct, there will be systematic undercompensation be-
cause infringers will opt for litigation when patent value is higher than the average
award and opt for a license when it is lower;155 but that seems to require a good deal
of foresight on the part of infringers, as well as a willingness to ignore the high cost
of attorney fees and (in some countries) the risk of enhanced damages if the defend-
ant knowingly infringes.156 In a somewhat similar vein, Ganglmaier et al. argue that
152 See, e.g., Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of
Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 78 (1994) (stating that "a property rule makes sense for pa-
tents because: (1) there are only two parties to the transaction, and they can easily identify each
other; (2) the costs of a transaction between the parties are otherwise low; and (3) a court setting
the terms of the exchange would have a difficult time doing so quickly and cheaply, given the spe-
cialized nature of the assets and the varied and complex business environments in which the assets
are deployed. Hence the parties are left to make their own deal.").
153 In the United States, however, the current practice is for courts that deny permanent injunctions to
award ongoing royalties using an increased royalty rate, which is determined post-trial. See Ac-
tiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1342-43 (Fed. Cir. 2012);
Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F. 3d 1353, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008). See infra notes 199-200 and
accompanying text for critique.
154 See Einer Elhauge, Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically Excessive Roy-
alties?, 4 J. COMP. L. & EcoN. 535, 557 (2008).
ss Id. at 557-58.
156 In most countries, the losing party pays not only its own attorney's fees but also some portion of
the prevailing party's fees as well. In the United States, by contrast, courts award attorney's fees
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limiting the patentee to FRAND damages may negatively affect the incentive to in-
novate.15 7 If I understand correctly, however, their model assumes that the ability in
some cases to recover more than the FRAND rate generates a more powerful incen-
tive to innovate, despite a paucity of evidence that the patent incentive plays a sub-
stantial role in inducing innovation in the industries most affected by the current
FRAND disputes.' Indeed, the risk of overcompensation might be the more sub-
stantial, if courts that deny injunctions award ongoing royalties based on a higher
royalty rate than they use to calculate damages for past infringement-a practice
that, unfortunately, the U.S. courts currently follow.' 59 In addition, I see no reason
why courts could not take into account an infringement defendant's (mis)behavior
in deciding whether an injunction is appropriate in a given case. In recent months,
for example, the FTC, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office have all recommended that owners of FRAND-encumbered SEPs
generally be denied injunctive relief, but subject to exceptions-for example, when
the defendant flatly refuses to pay a royalty that has been determined to be
FRAND.160
only in exceptional cases, but (unlike the practice in many countries) offer the possibility of en-
hanced damages for willful patent infringement. See COTTER, supra note 6, at 140-48, 209-11,
275-76, 327-28, 360, 370-72; Thomas F. Cotter, After a Six-Month Hiatus, Enhanced Damages
for Patent Infringement in Taiwan Are Back, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES (Aug. 6, 2013, 5:42
AM), available at http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2013/08/after-six-month-
hiatus-enhanced-damages.html.
1 Bernhard Ganglmair et al., Patent Hold-Up and Antitrust: How a Well-Intentioned Rule Could Re-
tard Innovation, 60 J. INDUS. EcoN. 249, 261-62 (2012). In Ganglmair et al.'s model, the prospec-
tive licensee can accept the patentee's offer and then bring a claim for damages measured by the
difference between the offered rate and the FRAND rate (which can be, but need not be, multiplied
as under U.S. antitrust law). Without a multiplier, the effect would be to limit the license fee to the
FRAND rate. The authors argue that this rule has ambiguous welfare consequences, because while
it prevents holdup, it can retard innovation if the bargaining power of the user and the value of the
new technology are high. They propose, as a superior solution, providing the manufacturer with an
ex ante option to license at a fixed fee before it invests in using the patented technology. Id. at
255-61.
1 See, e.g., Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 3
(2013) (arguing against allowing patents due to lack of empirical evidence showing that patents in-
crease innovation or productivity); Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets:
Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not), in NBER
WORKING PAPER No. 7552 (Feb. 2000), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552 (arguing
that patents are largely used for reasons other than to protect inventions); see also CENTER FOR
LAW AND INFORMATION POLICY, The Impact of the Acquisition and Use of Patents on the
Smartphone Industry, at 39 (Dec. 13, 2012), available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-
competition/en/studies/clipstudy.pdf ("For the leading smartphone companies, the patent grants
generally lagged several years behind market share gains. In other words, companies appeared to
gain market share and then received patent grants several years later. This is an important indica-
tion that company innovations are what generated increased market share rather than the patents
themselves and that companies appear to innovate in order to gain market share. Those gains are
then followed by patent grants on the original innovations.").
159 See Merges supra note 152; infra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
160 See, e.g. Decision and Order, In the Matter of Motorola Mobility LLC and Google Inc.,
Docket No. C-4410 §§ II.E, IV.F (FTC July 24, 2013), available at
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Relatedly, some commentators have argued that injunctions guard against the
risk of "reverse holdup," or "opportunistic behavior" by prospective licensees to
"propose rates that are significantly below the fair value or delay negotiations,
knowing that the patent holder would have little choice but to accept." 16 1 In a recent
paper, for example, Langus et al. use game theory to model a procedure, inspired by
European practice, under which a prospective licensee first makes an offer, which
the patentee can either accept or reject.162 If the offer is rejected, the dispute pro-
ceeds to litigation, where there will be a validity determination.16 3 If the patent is
valid, the next step is an initial determination by the court of whether the prospec-
tive licensee's offer was FRAND; if it was not, the defendant can make a second of-
fer before the court makes a final decision on whether to enter an injunction. 164In
Europe, courts award the losing party its attorney's fees. The authors report the fol-
lowing results. First, the risk of reverse holdup is greater than the risk of holdup
when the patent is sufficiently weak, litigation costs are high, and the time it would
take to obtain an injunction is long, because under these circumstances, the patent-
ee's incentive may be to accept an offer that is below FRAND.16 5 Second, reverse
holdup also can occur when the patent is strong but litigation costs are low and the
time to obtain an injunction long, because the prospective licensee will make a be-
low-FRAND offer that the patentee will reject, and will gamble on the court validat-
http://ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210120/130724googlemotorolado.pdf; Decision and Order (Redacted
Public Version), In the Matter of Robert Bosch GmbH, Docket No. C-4377, § IV.E (F.T.C. Apr.
24, 2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210081/130424robertboschdo.pdf; USDOJ
and USPTO, Policy Statement on Remedies for Standards-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary
F/RAND Commitments, at 7 (Jan. 8, 2013), available at www.justice.gov/atr/public
/guidelines/290994.pdf. For a critique of some of the exceptions suggested in the first and third of
the above documents, including an exception for a "constructive refusal to negotiate," and another
that would permit an SEP owner to seek injunctive relief when the defendant also is seeking in-
junctive relief for the infringement of an SEP against the plaintiff or is unwilling to make a
FRAND commitment, see Florian Mueller, FTC Finalizes Consent Decree in Google FRAND An-
titrust Case, Makes 'Technical Modifications, 'Foss PATENTS (July. 24, 2013, 9:26 PM), available
at http://www.fosspatents.com/2013/07/ftc-finalizes-consent-decree-in-google.html; Florian
Mueller, 'Defensive Use' Exception in FTC-Google Deal Identified as Primary Area of Concern,
Foss PATENTS (Jan. 9, 2013, 1:33 PM), available at http://www.fosspatents.com
/2013/01/defensive-use-exception-in-ftc-google.html; Florian Mueller, DoJ/USPTO Position Pa-
per on FRAND SEP Remedies Muddies the Water, Foss PATENTS (Jan. 8, 2013, 11:23 PM), avail-
able at http://www.fosspatents.com/2013/01/dojuspto-position-paper-on-frand-sep.html; Florian
Mueller, Comparison of the FTC's Standard-essential Patent Agreements with Google and Bosch,
Foss PATENTS (Jan. 4, 2013, 8:31 AM), available at http://www.fosspatents.com/2013/01
/comparison-of-ftcs-standard-essential.html.
161 Peter Camesasca et al., Injunctions for Standard-Essential Patents: Justice Is Not Blind, 9 J. COMP.
L. & ECON. 285, 287, 290 (2013).
162 Gregor Langus et al., Standard Essential Patents: Who Is Really Holding Up (and When)?, 9 J.
COMP. L. & ECON. 253, 259-77 (2013).
163 Id.
164 See the companion articles Camesasca et al., supra note 161, at 295, 298-99; Langus et al., supra
note 162.
165 Camesasca et. al., supra note 161, at 304.
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ing that below-FRAND rate.16 6 Third, holdup on the part of the patent owner occurs
only when there is an intermediate probability of invalidity and legal proceedings
are not too long.167 Fourth, injunctions play an important role in reducing reverse
holdup, because in the absence of injunctions "the length of the proceedings" (as
that variable is defined in the model) can then be equated to "the lifetime of the pa-
tent, as injunctions have no power left in those circumstances."1 68  Fifth, when a
court can actually set the FRAND rate itself, the licensee's incentive is to offer a be-
low-FRAND rate that the patent owner will accept to avoid incurring additional at-
torneys' fees. 169
I'm not sure I would draw too many practical conclusions from this analysis.
Whether holdup or reverse holdup is more likely to occur under the model appears
to depend on the value of the relevant parameters (probability of validity, length of
proceedings, cost of litigation); the presence of mandatory fee-shifting (found in
many, but not all, patent systems, though common throughout Europe); and the se-
quence of steps in the modeled procedure. 170 Changes in these parameters may lead
166 id.
167 Id. at 304-305.
168 Id. at 305.
169 See Camesasca et al., supra note 161, at 304-06; Langus et al., supra note 162, at 255-256.
170 See Langus et al., supra note 162, at 253-255 (showing that where the licensee gets to make only
one offer before the court decides whether to enjoin, the licensee is worse off and the patentee bet-
ter off than when the licensee gets to make two offers); id. at 276 (showing that where the patentee
makes the initial offer, "there will be hold-up in equilibrium"). But see Camesasca et al., supra
note 161, at 305-06 (stating that if the patentee makes the initial offer, "the reasoning would be
partly reversed," but that the patentee faces an asymmetric risk in comparison with the licensee, in
that the court may either (1) accept or reject the offer, or (2) declare the patent invalid). According
to Camesasca et al., "if the patent turns out to be invalid, the patent holder has to compensate the
legal cost of the prospective licensee and he will be ready to accept a lower rate ex ante to avoid
this outcome. This issue does not arise with the prospective licensee (who does not have to pay the
legal cost of the patent holder if the patent turns out to be valid ... )." I'm not sure I understand,
however, what's wrong with the patent owner's willingness to accept a lower rate when the validi-
ty of the patent is in doubt.
As noted above, the model also assumes that the court makes an initial determination of validi-
ty during the course of proceedings. In some nations, however-most notably, Germany-
infringement and validity proceedings are separate, and the infringement proceeding usually pro-
ceeds to judgment first. See COTTER, supra note 6, at 229 n.43, 279. In fact, the typical time to tri-
al in Germany appears to be about a year, which I think would qualify proceedings there as being
on the speedy side under Camesasca et al.'s analysis. See COTTER, supra note 6, at 229 n.45, 279.
The authors note that infringement and validity are bifurcated in Germany. See Camesasca et al.,
supra note 161, at 293, but argue that (1) in SEP disputes, there may be parallel proceedings occur-
ring in other countries in which the validity of the relevant national portion of that patent may be at
issue, and that such matters may be "brought to the attention of the German courts"; and (2) Ger-
man courts sometimes will stay proceedings pending a validity determination. See Camesasca et
al., supra note 161, at 295, 303. Stays are hardly automatic, however. See COTTER, supra note 6,
at 229 n.45, 279. On the other hand, the authors might have noted that German courts generally do
make a preliminary evaluation of validity if the patentee seeks a preliminary injunction. See
COTTER, supra note 6, at 243-44, although this may be of limited relevance if, as they assert, pre-
liminary injunctions are not often granted in SEP cases. See Camesasca et al., supra note 161, at
293.
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to different conclusions (and, of course, ultimately the question of whether holdup
or reverse holdup dominates is an empirical one). Moreover, even if reverse holdup
as defined by the authors is likely to occur more often than holdup, it may be that
the social harm resulting from the latter is greater than the social harm resulting
from the former, if the incentive to innovate within the affected industries is not
very sensitive to the patent incentive.17 1
Third, if my analysis is correct, the question of whether courts should or should
not award injunctions depends primarily on the risk of holdup. Courts therefore
should focus on whether the evidence suggests a substantial risk of holdup if the de-
fendant is enjoined; the pertinent factors would be whether the end product incorpo-
rates numerous patents, whether the patented invention would be easy or difficult to
design around ex ante, and whether the infringement was knowing or inadvertent.
In particular, a patentee's having declared the patent in suit to be standard-essential
often would be powerful evidence of a substantial holdup risk, because many stand-
ards relate to complex end products that potentially incorporate numerous patents,
and because standardization suggests that the defendant cannot readily design
around the patent. (From a policy perspective, the presence of a FRAND commit-
ment would not appear to be a sine qua non, though it may have doctrinal relevance
for reasons discussed above.) The one factor that may or may not be present is in-
advertence. Where this factor is not present (for example, in the case of deliberate
copying), the case for granting an injunction is stronger (though it may be that the
defendant wrongly but in good faith believed the patent to be invalid). In such in-
stances, allowing the court to evaluate the strength and relevance of the factors, ra-
The authors also state that implementing an injunction is "not without risk," because the pa-
tentee may have to pay damages to the defendant if the patent is subsequently revoked or the in-
fringement judgment reversed on appeal. See Camesasca et al., supra note 161, at 296-97. My
understanding, however, is that the patentee may be liable for damages, which could exceed the
amount of the injunction bond, for what is subsequently determined to be a wrongly-issued prelim-
inary injunction (which, again, the authors state is unlikely to occur in any event). Following the
entry of a final judgment, the patentee would be liable only for restitution of damages the defend-
ant has paid the patentee, if the patent is later declared invalid; moreover, a licensee is not entitled
to restitution of payments made under a license of a subsequently invalided patent. See COTTER,
supra note 6, at 182-83 n.74; Thomas F. Cotter, U.K. Supreme Court Holds that Infringement De-
fendant Is Not Required to Pay Damages Where Patent Claims in Suit Are Revoked by the EPO,
COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES (July 4, 2013, 3:50 AM), available at
http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2013/07/uk-supreme-court-allows-overrules-
res.html; Thomas F. Cotter, Remedies for Wrongful Patent Litigation or Enforcement in Some Oth-
er Leading Patent Systems, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES (May 27, 2013), available at
http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2013/05/remedies-for-wrongful-patent-
litigation.html; Thomas F. Cotter, Some Thoughts on Remedies for Wrongful Patent Litigation or
Enforcement Under U.S. Law, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES (May 23, 2013), available at
http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2013/05/some-thoughts-on-remedies-for-
wrongful.html.
171 See Ganglmair et al., supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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ther than imposing a rigid rule either in favor or in opposition to injunctive relief,
may be a sensible policy. 172
B. The Comparative Advantages of Contract, Patent, and Competition
Law
In Part II.A above, I argued that courts generally should not award injunctions
for the infringement of SEPs. In this section, I turn to the question of which body of
law is best positioned to achieve this result.
As discussed in Part I, contract law is a possibility if the SEP is encumbered by
a FRAND obligation, and the court reads that obligation as conferring enforceable
third-party rights to avoid injunctive relief upon payment of the FRAND royalty.
Whether this is a reasonable interpretation of a given FRAND commitment will de-
pend on the wording of that commitment and on the substantive law of the country
or state by which the contract is to be interpreted-as will the further question of
whether the court should take it upon itself to craft the terms of the FRAND license.
I am not a contracts scholar, and will offer no opinion on whether the courts in the
U.S. or elsewhere thus far have properly interpreted the governing law on these is-
sues-though like Brooks and Geradin, I suspect that some of the more ambitious
interpretations that have been proposed in the literature may read too much into the
nature of the FRAND commitment, simply as a matter of contract law." Of
172 But see Cotropia & Lemley, supra note 149 (suggesting that "inadvertence" may not always be an
intuitive concept).
1 See Roger G. Brooks & Damien Geradin, Interpreting and Enforcing the Voluntary FRAND Com-
mitment, 9 INT'L J. IT STANDARDS & STANDARDIZATION RES. 1, 2-3 (2011). Brooks and Geradin
note that [a]uthors have variously argued that, in order to satisfy a "fair and reasonable" commit-
ment, a patent holder:
* Must charge no more than the incremental value of his invention over the next
best technical alternative (Lemley & Shapiro, 2007; Dolmans, 2008; Temple Lang,
2007);
* Must not negotiate for a royalty-free cross licence as part of the consideration for
a license (Dolmans, 2008);
* Must set his royalty rate based on a mathematical proportion of all patents essen-
tial to the practice of a standard (Chappatte, 2009; Temple Lang, 2007);
* Must set his royalty rate in such a way as to prevent cumulative royalties on the
standardised product from exceeding a low percentage of the total sale price of that
product (Lemley & Shapiro, 2007);
* Must not raise requested royalty rates after the standard has been adopted, or af-
ter the relevant market has grown to maturity (Chappatte, 2009; Shapiro & Varian,
1999; Swanson & Baumol, 2005);
* Is not entitled to seek injunctive relief against a standard implementer should
they fail to agree on licence terms (Farrell et al.,2007; Temple Lang, 2007).
Id. at 2. See also Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organiza-
tions, 90 CALIF. L. REv. 1889, 1915, 1924-26 (2002) (arguing that SSO members would be third-
party beneficiaries of a FRAND commitment, but that nonmembers probably would not have en-
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course, there may be advantages to resolving the relevant issues, where possible,
through contract as opposed to public law.17 4
I would note a few interesting consequences of applying contract law to the
types of disputes under consideration. First, the contract issue only comes up when
there is, in fact, a FRAND obligation. It therefore does not provide a tool for deny-
ing injunctive relief in a broader class of cases in which holdup risk may be present.
Second, proceeding against the patent owner with a breach of contract claim may
enable the user/infringer to avoid application, in the United States, of the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine, if two recent decisions on this point are correct.'75 Third, if
successful a contract claim could lead to an award of damages against the patent
owner for breach of contract; presumably this could include incidental and reasona-
forceable third-party beneficiary rights under U.S. law; and that a FRAND commitment itself con-
stitutes an implied license for third parties to use the patented technology, subject to the obligation
to pay a FRAND royalty); Lichtman, supra note 2, at 1043 n.56 (suggesting that the patentee
might be equitably estopped from requesting an injunction). Brooks and Geradin concede that
these economic arguments "may well be useful in debating public policy and the proper applica-
tion of antitrust rules." Id. at 2. Furthermore, they may help "to better understand the course of the
contract negotiations, or the contemporaneous industry practices" surrounding the drafting of the
policies giving rise to FRAND obligations. Id. at 5. However, Brooks and Geradin argue that, alt-
hough ETSI's IPR Policy and other similar SSO policies do create binding contractual obligations,
the most relevant consideration for interpreting those obligations is the intent of the parties (i.e.,
the SSO members). Id. at 11. Based on their review of the drafting history of ETSI Policy and
other sources, they conclude that the intent of the parties was simply this:
if an offer has been made and refused,... the only contractual question to be adju-
dicated is whether the terms offered, taking into account all of the specific circum-
stances between the parties and prevailing market conditions, fall outside the range
of reasonableness contemplated by the FRAND commitment.
Id. On this view, a court considering a claim for breach of the FRAND commitment does not need
to determine what a reasonable royalty would be. Id. For other discussions, see, e.g., Chengjian &
Xiao, supra note 73, at 28-33 (presenting three models of how a FRAND commitment could be in-
terpreted-(1) "no injunction is granted in all events," (2) "license negotiation under court supervi-
sion," and (3) "license negotiation before injunction takes effect"-and arguing in favor of the
third option, under which a court would grant an injunction but stay its effect while the parties ne-
gotiate the terms of a license. If no license is concluded, the court would then determine whether
the defendant's offer was within the FRAND range; if so, the injunction would be lifted); Ko, su-
pra note 30, at 13-17 (proposing a two-step procedure under which a court would encourage vol-
untary bargaining).
174 See supra note 8.
175 In both Apple v. Motorola and Microsoft v. Motorola, the courts held that Noerr-Pennington did
not immunize Motorola from liability for breach of contract claims premised on Motorola's seek-
ing injunctive relief. See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1078
(W.D. Wis. 2012) ("Although the First Amendment protects Motorola's right to petition the courts
to enforce its patents, Apple's breach of contract claims are based on the theory that Motorola
agreed by contract that it would not enforce its patent rights until it offered a license to Apple on
fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms. In other words, Apple contends that Motorola
waived some of its petitioning rights through contract. It would be improper to use the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine to bar Apple from enforcing that contract."); accord Microsoft Corp. v.
Motorola, Inc., No. C 10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 4053225, at *16-17 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 12, 2013).
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bly foreseeable consequential damages resulting from the patent owner's failure to
abide by the FRAND commitment.176 A contract claim in the present context is
therefore somewhat analogous to other types of claims, rooted in unfair competition
or other bodies of law, that sometimes may be available for wrongful patent en-
forcement.1" In future work, I hope to analyze and compare the various claims for
wrongful enforcement that the worlds' major patent systems make available.
C. Patent Versus Competition Law
The next question is whether competition law or the law of patent remedies
(possibly supplemented by other generally applicable legal principles such as
"abuse of right") offers a better set of tools for attaining the policy end of avoiding
holdup by denying injunctions in cases involving SEPs. I will argue that, in theory,
it makes more sense to provide the needed flexibility within the law of patent reme-
dies than to require courts to invoke competition law to reach the same end. If this
proposed application of the law of patent remedies is too radical a step for most of
the European systems to adopt at this time, however, the use of competition law
may be an acceptable second-best solution, particularly where the latter body of
law, unlike in the United States, does not offer litigants the recovery of treble dam-
ages.
The law of patent remedies seems to have a comparative advantage over com-
petition law for several reasons. The most obvious is simplicity. If a request for in-
junctive relief poses a serious risk of patent holdup-and if one believes, as I argued
above, that the social benefits of injunctive relief, including the benefit of not hav-
ing to calculate ongoing damages, are outweighed by the social costs of holdup-
the most straightforward solution is to deny the injunction and award ongoing dam-
ages. No one necessarily has to determine whether the patentee possesses monopo-
ly power, or to define the market, or to evaluate the parties' negotiating history to
see whether the patentee (or the infringer) is guilty of bad faith or abuse. To be
sure, if the patent owner has little or no market power, there probably isn't a sub-
stantial risk of holdup because, by definition, the infringer can easily design around.
In some cases, it might be necessary to determine if the infringer acted in bad faith
176 See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C 10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 4008822, at *1 (W.D. Wash.
Aug. 5, 2013) (noting that Microsoft sought incidental and foreseeable consequential damages re-
sulting from Motorola's failure to abide by the FRAND commitment).
177 See Thomas F. Cotter, U.K. Supreme Court Holds that Infringement Defendant Is Not Required to
Pay Damages Where Patent Claims in Suit Are Revoked by the EPO, COMPARATIVE PATENT
REMEDIES (July 4, 2013, 3:50 AM), available at http://comparativepatentremedies
.blogspot.com/2013/07/uk-supreme-court-allows-overrules-res.html; Thomas F. Cotter, Remedies
for Wrongful Patent Litigation or Enforcement in Some Other Leading Patent Systems,
COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES (May 27, 2013 5:28 AM), available at
http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2013/05/remedies-for-wrongful-patent-
litigation.html; Thomas F. Cotter, Some Thoughts on Remedies for Wrongful Patent Litigation or
Enforcement Under U.S. Law, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES (May 23, 2013 9:12 AM),
available at http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2013/05/some-thoughts-on-remedies-
for-wrongful.html.
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by refusing to accept a reasonable offer; to the extent reverse holdup is a potential
problem, it should be avoided. Nevertheless, a presumptive rule in favor of damag-
es-only in cases involving SEPs ought to enable courts to avoid addressing these is-
sues, or addressing them in depth, in a broad range of cases.
I have argued before that, where possible, it probably makes sense to confine
overly expansive applications of intellectual property rights through the judicious
use of intellectual property law-based exceptions and other doctrines, rather than
through the use of competition law. 17 8 In part, my position reflects a preference for
a U.S.-style competition law regime that focuses on harm to the competitive pro-
cess-monopoly acquisition or expansion-over a European-style system that, to
some degree, is intended to counter monopoly exploitation or extraction as well.179
Not that I'm a big fan of monopoly exploitation-far from it. But I am concerned
that a system that focuses on exploitation as opposed to expansion invites many
problems-among them the difficulties of requiring courts or antitrust enforcers to
determine what a fair return is, in the manner of public utility regulators. The in-
herent subjectivity of the task, along with risks of erroneous decisions (that then
may have precedential value, with potentially wide-ranging effect, in future cases)
and of bending competition law to protect competitors instead of the competitive
process, all seem to me to counsel against deploying doctrines such as essential fa-
cilities or abuse of dominant position in all but the most extreme cases. so
In addition, intellectual property law can-and often, rightly, does-condemn
some uses of intellectual property rights that do not threaten any demonstrable mo-
nopoly acquisition or expansion. I have argued that a rationale uniting many of the
relevant doctrines, which include not only fair use and merger in copyright law, but
178 See Cotter, supra note 107, at 173; Thomas F. Cotter, Intellectual Property and the Essential Fa-
cilities Doctrine, 44 ANTITRUST BULL. 211, 249-50 (1999); Thomas F. Cotter, Evaluating the Pro-
and Anticompetitive Effects of Intellectual Property Protection, ANTITRUST SOURCE (Mar. 2006), at
5-6, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust source
/Mar06_CotterRev3_22f.authcheckdam.pdf (reviewing ANTITRUST, PATENTS AND COPYRIGHT: EU
AND US PERSPECTIVES, (2005)).
179 See Dennis W. Carlton & Ken Heyer, Appropriate Antitrust Policy Towards Single-Firm Conduct,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS GROUP DISCUSSION PAPER 08-2, 7-8, 16 (Mar. 2008), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-I111665 (arguing that "[c]onduct merely to extract surplus the firm has
created independent of the conduct's effect on rivals should be permitted. Conversely, conduct that
extends the firm's market power by impairing the competitive constraints imposed by rivals pre-
sents a legitimate cause for concern.").
180 In correspondence, Norman Siebrasse suggests that my preference for patent over antitrust solu-
tions to the problem of patent holdup may be misplaced, because antitrust enforcement agencies
may have a better grasp of the underlying economic issues than would a typical court hearing a pa-
tent case. That certainly may be true, at least in some places, although in the U.S., the agencies
would still have to make their case before a court of general jurisdiction, just as a private litigant
would in a patent matter. To a considerable extent, my preferred solution reflects my concern over
certain features of U.S. antitrust litigation, including the prevalence of private antitrust suits and
the use of juries in such suits, which are of lesser or no moment in other systems; competition law
therefore may be a more acceptable tool for addressing patent holdup in such systems, see infra
notes 180-85 and accompanying text.
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also experimental use and (possibly) misuse in patent and functionality in trademark
law, is (not only) that they sometimes work to minimize transaction costs, but that
they reduce even small or unquantifiable risks of harm to dynamic efficiency that
are not justified by what may be only a marginal incentive benefit arising from
stronger intellectual property rights.' 8 ' In a similar vein, Bohannan and Hovenkamp
have argued that courts can apply intellectual property law to remedy "innovation
restraints" that threaten dynamic efficiency but not quantifiable anticompetitive
harm.182 Replacing a right to injunctive relief with a right to an ongoing royalty, in
appropriate cases, is yet another example of trying to solve an intellectual property
problem with the use of intellectual property tools, without all the cumbersome ma-
chinery-and risk of overextension-inherent to the competition law approach.18 3
That said, it doesn't necessarily follow that the U.S. eBay approach is the gold
standard for resolving problems relating to SEPs. I have argued before that, by
placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff and (arguably) requiring evidence in
support of all four of the relevant factors (as opposed to a more traditional equitable
balancing), the eBay standard may have altered the playing field more than neces-
sary to remedy the holdup problem.184 At the same time, the abuse of right concept
as deployed against Samsung in cases in the Netherlands'8 5 and Japan'86 seems to
me to place too much emphasis on the parties' states of mind and to risk introducing
considerable subjectivity into the analysis. The Japanese approach also seems trou-
bling for the additional reason that it appears to deny the SEP owner any remedy in
the event of an abuse of right, thus potentially encouraging reverse holdup and un-
duly undermining the patent incentive. The approach embodied in article 12 of the
E.C. Enforcement Directive, by contrast, seems to focus more clearly on the rele-
vant issues, if the purpose is to avoid patent holdup, by stating that nations may de-
ny injunctions in cases in which the infringement is inadvertent ("unintentionally
and without negligence"), an injunction would impose a disproportionate burden on
the defendant, and monetary compensation would be adequate.'87 Perhaps the Eu-
181 See Thomas F. Cotter, The Procompetitive Interest in Intellectual Property Law, 48 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 483 (2006); see also Thomas F. Cotter, Four Questionable Rationales for the Patent Mis-
use Doctrine, 12 MINN. J. L. Scl. & TECH. 457, 468-69 (2011) (discussing experimental use while
remaining skeptical of the patent misuse doctrine, which may be viewed as fairly standardless to
the extent it departs from antitrust); Thomas F. Cotter, Response, IP Misuse and Innovation Harm,
96 IOWA L. REv. Bulletin 52, 57 n.30 (2011) (suggesting that even though employee noncompete
agreements do not usually violate antitrust law, states such as California that prohibit most non-
competes may better promote innovation).
182 See CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: PROMOTING
LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 238-57 (2011).
183 See Ganglmair et al., supra note 157..
184 See COTTER, supra note 6, at 102-07.
1 See supra text accompanying notes 60-61.
186 See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
187 See E.C. Enforcement Directive, supra note 51, at art. 12. Some states might need to redefine the
meaning of "negligence," though. See COTTER, supra note 6, at 245 (noting that under German
law, negligence on the part of the infringer is presumed because patents are public records).
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ropean nations could shift the terms of the debate away from the pros and cons of
eBay by introducing into their national laws the arguably superior approach that ar-
ticle 12 already permits.
If this solution won't fly, however, at least not in the short run, European law
may be able to reach the same result through judicious application of competition
law. Although the two press releases announcing the European Commission's
Statements of Objections against Samsung and Motorola are both careful to state
that "recourse to injunctions ... may be abusive where SEPs are concerned and the
potential licensee is willing to" negotiate a FRAND license'88-and that the Com-
mission is "not prejudg[ing] the final outcome of [its] investigation"l 89 -the Com-
mission in the Motorola press release also states that it "considers at this stage that
dominant SEP holders should not have recourse to injunctions, which generally in-
volve a prohibition to sell the product infringing the patent, in order to distort li-
censing negotiations and impose unjustified licensing terms on patent licensees.' 90
This might foreshadow the formal adoption of a general presumption against grant-
ing injunctions in cases involving SEPs, as long as the prospective licensee demon-
strates a sufficient willingness to accept a FRAND license. 191 Moreover, since there
188 Press Release, European Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of Objections to
Motorola Mobility on Potential Misuse of Mobile Phone Standard-Essential Patents (May 6, 2013)
(emphasis added), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-13-406_en.htm; Press Re-
lease, European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of Objections to Samsung
on Potential Misuse of Mobile Phone Standard-Essential Patents (Dec. 21, 2012) (emphasis add-
ed), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release IP-12-1448_en.htm.
189 Press Release (May 6, 2013), supra note 188; Press Release (Dec. 21, 2012), supra note 188.
190 Press Release, European Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of Objections to
Motorola Mobility on Potential Misuse of Mobile Phone Standard-Essential Patents (May 6, 2013),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP- 13-406_en.htm.
191 See Memorandum, European Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of Objections to
Motorola Mobility on Potential Misuse of Mobile Phone Standard-Essential Patents--Questions
and Answers (May 6, 2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseMEMO-13-403_en.htm:
[T]he Commission is of the preliminary view that Apple's willingness to enter into
a FRAND licence manifested itself in particular by its acceptance to be bound by a
German court's determination of a FRAND royalty rate. The Commission's pre-
liminary view is that the acceptance of binding third party determination for the
terms of a FRAND licence in the event that bilateral negotiations do not come to a
fruitful conclusion is a clear indication that a potential licensee is willing to enter
into a FRAND licence. This process allows for adequate remuneration of the SEP-
holder so that seeking or enforcing injunctions is no longer justified once a poten-
tial licensee has accepted such a process.
By contrast, a potential licensee which remains passive and unresponsive to a
request to enter into licensing negotiations or is found to employ clear delaying
tactics cannot be generally considered as "willing."
The requirement that the patent owner possess a dominant position might not be difficult to estab-
lish. See Walz, supra note 58, at 719 (stating that, because alternative solution to the use of
UMTS-technology are simply unthinkable, every single owner of a standard-essential UMTS pa-
tent enjoys quite significant market power due to the exclusionary effect arising from the respec-
tive patent). To be sure, it may be that many declared SEPs are not really standard-essential, and
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are no treble damages suits in Europe-and, so far, relatively little private antitrust
litigation at all-some of the risks of abuse arising from prospective licensees' be-
havior may be more attenuated than they would be in the U.S. setting. Questions
that still need to be resolved, however, include the quantum of damages to which
the SEP owner is entitled for the defendant's past infringement,192 and whether
courts may impose ongoing FRAND royalties in cases where injunctions are de-
nied. Eliminating the SEP owner's right to claim damages altogether, however, as
in the Japanese decision in Apple v. Samsung,'9 3 seems to invite licensee abuse.
IV. Determining the FRAND Royalty
Commentators have suggested and critiqued a variety of techniques and tools
for determining FRAND royalties,194 but for present purposes I will focus on what
may be the most obvious approach for use in litigation-namely, to apply (with
some appropriate modifications) the methodology that courts generally employ in
setting reasonable royalties for patent infringement. Section A below sets out the
general method of analysis with the appropriate modifications. Section B analyzes
Judge Robart's calculation of a FRAND royalty in Microsoft v. Motorola, in view
of my proposed modifications.
infringement defendants may contest both validity and infringement. But perhaps it is or should be
sufficient to establish market dominance that the patentee is asserting what it claims to be a stand-
ard-essential patent. See supra note 2.
192 See Mueller, supra note 142 (noting that one of the questions referred to the CJEU is whether "the
requirements for the presumption of abuse of a dominant market position by an SEP holder also
apply to other remedies for patent infringement (disclosures relating to past infringement, recall (of
infringing products from distribution channels], damages)"); See also GRUR 966 (966), translated
in 336 IIC 741, 748-49 (asserting that, when competition law entitles a defendant to use a patent,
"compensation for damages to the plaintiff resulting from the use the defendant has made can in
any case only be demanded for the amount to which the plaintiff would have been entitled if it had
not refused (illegally) to grant the defendant . . . a licence for the disputed patent"). Walz argues
that this is correct, and that a court in such a case should not award defendant's profits, even
though the latter remedy is commonly viewed as one of the plaintiffs three damages options in
Germany. Walz, supra note 58, at 729-30. See also Florian Mueller, Samsung Seeks Supra-
FRAND Royalty from Apple in Germany but Backtracks on Disgorgement, Foss PATENTS (Sept.
21, 2013, 1:00 PM) available at, http://www.fosspatents.com/2013/09/samsung-seeks-supra-frand-
royalty-from.html (stating that Samsung dropped a claim for an award of infringer's profits in a re-
cent German case). This makes sense, if the goal is to place the defendant in roughly the same po-
sition it would have occupied had the parties negotiated a FRAND license ex ante, but note that,
although the United States awards defendants' profits only in design patent and some copyright
and trademark cases, most other countries make this remedy generally available for the infringe-
ment of utility patents. Thomas F. Cotter, Reining in Remedies in Patent Litigation: Three (In-
creasingly Immodest) Proposals, 30 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (2013).
193 See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
194 See, e.g., VirnetX, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 925 F.Supp.2d 816 (E.D. Tex. 2013) (Nash bargaining); TV
Interactive Data Corp. v. Sony Corp., 929 F.Supp2d 1006 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (conjoint analysis);
Daniel G. Swanson & William J. Baumol, Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory (RAND) Royalties,
Standards Selection, and Control of Market Power, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2005) (proposing an ex
ante auction model); Pierre Dehez & Sophie Poukens, The Shapley Value as a Guide to FRAND
Licensing Agreements, CORE DiscussioN PAPER 2013/12, available at
http://uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/core/documents/coredp20l3_1 2.pdf.
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A. General Calculation Issues
In calculating reasonable royalties for the infringement of patent rights, courts
in the United States and elsewhere often attempt to replicate the bargain that a will-
ing licensor and licensee would have struck, as of a date just prior to the date on
which the infringement began, knowing that the patent was both valid and in-
fringed.195 Though counterintuitive, the assumption that the parties would have
bargained with knowledge of both validity and infringement is necessary to avoid a
double discounting problem.'96 From an economic perspective, the amount the pro-
spective licensee would have been willing to pay, as of the date infringement com-
menced, should be some fraction of the additional profit or cost saving he anticipat-
ed by using the patented technology as opposed to the next-best available
noninfringing alternative.'9 Because this amount is often very difficult to quantify,
however, courts normally consider various proxies and other relevant indicia, in-
cluding the value of comparable licenses and the advantages actually derived from
the use of the patent.'" (In the U.S., the traditional factors are known as the Geor-
gia-Pacific factors, after the case in which they were first set out in the current fash-
ion.)' 99 In the context of disputes involving SEPs, there are three possible modifica-
tions to this standard approach that deserve attention.
The first relates to the question of timing. As noted above, in the typical case
the court attempts to replicate the bargain the parties would have reached as of the
date the infringement began. In theory, though, the date of the hypothetical negotia-
195 See COTTER, supra note 6, at 95-96, 119-39, 194-97, 266-70, 321-23, 357-59, 369-71. There
are, to be sure, some variations from one nation to another. In Germany, for example, the standard
is said to be "what the parties would have agreed to, as of the date of the hypothetical agreement, if
they had foreseen the future development and the duration and amount of use of the patent," while
in the U.K., some case law holds that noninfringing alternatives are irrelevant to the calculation.
See id at 195, 266.
196 See id. at 135.See also Stephen Kalos & Jonathan D.Putnam, On the Incomparability of "Compa-
rable ": An Economic Interpretation of "Infringer's Royalties," 9 J. PROPRIETARY RTs. 2, 4-5
(1997) (providing the illustration: suppose that A owns a patent and that B is contemplating the
launch of a product that arguably would incorporate that patent. Suppose further that both parties
believe that: (1) there is a 70% probability the patent is valid; (2) there is an independent 80%
probability that B's product would incorporate the patent; and (3) the present value of B's expected
profit from the arguable use of the patent, over and above what B would earn from using the next-
best noninfringing alternative, is $2 million. If the parties are equally good bargainers (meaning
that they will share the gains from trade on a 50-50 basis), one would expect them to agree to a
royalty under which B would pay A $560,000, calculated as follows: $2 million x 0.7 x 0.8 x 0.5=
$560,000. In the event B infringes rather than licenses, A should recover $1 million, not $560,000.
The reason is that if A knew she could recover only $560,000 if she went to trial, her expected
payoff from going to trial would be $560,000 x 0.7 x 0.8 = $313,000. In other words, there would
be a double discounting problem unless the royalty awarded at the patent infringement trial at-
tempts to replicate what A and B would have agreed to ex ante, on the assumption that they both
knew the patent to be valid and infringed).
197 See COTTER, supra note 6, at 128.
19 Id at 67, 131.
199 See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), mod-
ified on appeal, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971).
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tions arguably should be the date on which the infringer committed to using the pa-
tented technology, rather than the date on which infringement began, because a roy-
alty calculated after the date on which the infringer committed to using the technol-
ogy will, to some degree, reflect the value of other complementary investments that
depend on their ability to interact with the patented technology. There is, in other
words, a degree of lock-in that occurs after a technology is chosen but before it is
implemented. 20 0 Nevertheless, in the typical case it probably isn't worthwhile to
make any distinction between date of commitment and date of first infringement,
both because the first date may be difficult to determine and because the portion of
the royalty attributable to the complementary investments may be small. Put anoth-
er way, design-around often may not be unduly burdensome up until the point that
infringement actually begins.2 0' In SEP cases, however, the distinction between
date of commitment and date of infringement can be substantial. In particular, once
a standard is selected, there is no easy turning back even if no one is actually using
the standard just yet. Using the date of infringement in this context therefore is
likely to exacerbate the risk of patent holdup. Instead, courts should calculate the
royalty based on the amount willing parties would have negotiated prior to the
adoption of the standard, because a large part of a royalty negotiated after that date
will reflect not the inherent value of the technology itself in comparison with other
possible alternatives, but rather the difficulty of avoiding use of a technology for
which ex post there may be no feasible alternatives.20 2
A second issue is whether to retain the assumption that the parties would have
bargained in the belief the patent was valid and infringed. As noted above, this as-
sumption is sensible in infringement cases 203 and therefore should apply whenever
an SEP sues for infringement. If a court is trying to estimate the hypothetical royal-
ty outside this context, however, as in the Microsoft v. Motorola breach of contract
action, it is correct to consider (as Judge Robart did)2 04 the probability of validity
and infringement as relevant factors in determining the licensing rate. In this con-
text, the double discounting problem disappears because there has been no determi-
nation of validity or infringement. The result, though it sounds a bit paradoxical, is
that a FRAND rate decided pre-patent infringement litigation should be lower than
a FRAND rate involving the same patent decided during the course of infringement
litigation. 205
200 See COTrER, supra note 6, at 127 n.207.
201 id
202 See Cotter, supra note 192, at 110 n.45 (quoting Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d
901, 913 (N.D. Ill. 2012)). See also Lichtman, supra note 2, at 1043 (quoting Apple, Inc., 869 F.
Supp. 2d at 913).
203 See supra note 196.
204 See infra note 213.
205 Contra Dennis W. Carlton & Allan L. Shampine, An Economic Interpretation of FRAND, 9 J.
COMP. L. & ECON. 531, 552 (2013) (arguing that, in the context of FRAND royalties, a firm that
succeeds in proving infringement of its SEP should not be able to recover more than the pre-
litigation FRAND rate). Complications may arise if the royalty is determined in patent infringe-
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A third issue is whether, if a court denies a permanent injunction, the royalty
rate for the prospective use of the patent should be increased further yet. As noted
above, courts in the United States post-eBay have answered this question in the af-
firmative, on the ground that the postjudgment bargaining position of the parties has
changed in favor of the patentee.20 6 This is economic nonsense, however, because it
undermines the principal policy rationale-the avoidance of patent holdup-that in
my view underlies the decision not to award a permanent injunction in the first
place. It also ignores the fact that the royalty for prejudgment infringement is
based, as noted above, on the assumption that the parties bargained in the belief that
the patent was valid and infringed, so in that sense nothing at all has changed that
requires an upward departure from the royalty rate used to determine prejudgment
damages. 2 07 The rate therefore should be the same for both pre- and postjudgment
royalties. Perhaps the Federal Circuit could be convinced to depart from its unfor-
tunate rule at least in cases in which the patentee has committed to accept a FRAND
royalty, on the theory that a court should not impose what amounts to a supra-
FRAND royalty for the postjudgment use of a FRAND-encumbered patent.
B. Microsoft v. Motorola 20 8
In 2010, Motorola offered to license two portfolios of purportedly standard-
essential patents to Microsoft. Believing that the asking price of 2.25% per unit was
too high, Microsoft filed suit, requesting among other things a declaratory judgment
(1) that Microsoft was a third-beneficiary of Motorola's FRAND commitment to the
IEEE and ETSI, and (2) that Motorola had breached that contract. As noted in Part
I above, Judge Robart in 2012 held that Microsoft was indeed a third-party benefi-
209
ciary of an enforceable contract.20 In April 2013, Judge Robart issued his findings
of fact and conclusions of law on what a FRAND royalty for the patents at issue
would be, as well as the possible range of what a FRAND royalty could be (which
may be relevant to determining whether Motorola's offer was in good faith).210
ment litigation, but before a validity determination is made. See, e.g., Innovatio IP Ventures, supra
note 22. If validity is later upheld in that same litigation, should the FRAND royalty go up? See
Cotter, supra note 22 for a tentative argument that the answer is no.
206 See supra note 153.
207 See COTTER, supra note 6, at 127-28; Cotter, supra note 185, at 111-12; Mark A. Lemley, The
Ongoing Confusion over Ongoing Royalties, 76 Mo. L. REv. 695 (2011).
208 Portions of this section have been discussed in previous articles. See Thomas F. Cotter, Some Ini-
tial Reactions to Judge Robart's Opinion in Microsoft v. Motorola, INTELLECTUAL IP (May 3,
2013), available at http://intellectualip.com/2013/05/03/some-initial-reactions-to-judge-robarts-
opinion-in-microsoft-v-motorola/; Thomas F. Cotter, More on Establishing the Value of a FRAND
Royalty, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES (May 14, 2013), available at
http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2013/05/more-on-establishing-value-of-
frand.html.
209 See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 993, 999 (W.D. Wash. 2012).
210 See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C1O-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217 (W.D. Wash. Apr.
25, 2013).
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In making this determination, Judge Robart applied a modified version of the
Georgia-Pacific factors.2 1 1 Among the notable features of his opinion are: (1) the
conclusion (correct, as I have argued above) that a patent royalty should reflect the
value of the patented invention only, and not the "holdup" value that may result
from trying to extract a better deal after a standard incorporating the patent has been
chosen; (2) that in industries in which many patents are likely incorporated into a
device, courts should avoid royalty stacking that would result in aggregate royalties
exceeding the value of the device; (3) the recognition that incremental value (that is,
the value of the patented invention over the next-best alternative) is the theoretically
correct measure of patent value, though one that may be difficult to estimate in
practice; (4) the importance of carefully considering which purportedly comparable
licenses are, in fact, comparable to the hypothetical license between the patent own-
er and the user; and (5) the importance of considering how important (or unim-
portant) the patent is to the user.
Judge Robart's legal and economic analysis is, for the most part, sound. First,
as I suggested above should be the case, Judge Robart appears to have modified the
time frame by attempting to reconstruct the hypothetical bargain the parties would
have negotiated before the standard at issue was adopted, rather than at the time Mi-
crosoft may have begun using the patents in suit.212 Second, as noted earlier, be-
cause this was a breach of contract action occurring prior to any finding of in-
fringement or validity, Judge Robart correctly did not assume that the parties would
have assumed infringement and validity, but rather took into account the possibility
that Microsoft was not using some of the Motorola patents at all. 213 Third, in some
instances Judge Robart was convinced by neither side's conclusions regarding valu-
ation and simply proceeded on his own.214 This contrasts with the approach of
Judge Posner in Apple v. Motorola, who when convinced that neither side's damag-
es experts had tendered admissible opinions dismissed the action altogether, on the
ground that there is no right to proceed to trial for a judgment of nominal damag-
es. 215 Whether in such cases the court should attempt to reach a reasonable result
notwithstanding flaws in the evidence-and if so, on what basis-or dismiss is hard
to say; perhaps it is or should be relevant whether the relevant portion of the trial is
to a jury or to a judge, and whether the party with the burden of proof is the patentee
(as in Apple) or the user (as, I think, should be the case in a breach of contract mat-
ter such as in Microsoft).216
211 See id. at *92, *93, *105-06, *121.
212 See id. at *37-38. Elsewhere, however, Judge Robart states that RAND licenses can be negotiated
"after an SSO adopts a standard." Id at *14.
213 See, e.g., id. at *92, *93, *105-06, *121.
214 See, e.g., id. at *112, *116.
215 See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
216 Courts in some countries may have greater leeway to estimate damages on their own. See, e.g.,
Marcus Sch6nknecht, Determination of Patent Damages in Germany, 43 International Review of
Intellectual Property and Competition Law 309, 311-12 (2012) (discussing courts' ability to calcu-
late damages nachfreier Oberzeugung).
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Fourth, while I find most of Judge Robart's analysis persuasive (subject to the
caveat that I have not reviewed the underlying evidence), the judge appears to have
made some math errors in a lengthy footnote in which he tries to derive the lower
end of the FRAND range by means of a comparison with the royalty that Motorola
would have earned from its patents had it been a member of the relevant patent pool
for the technology in question.217 Specifically, Judge Robart presents an algebraic
analysis of how the value of a patent pool royalty would relate to the value of a roy-
alty calculated outside the pool. Judge Robart proposes that the value to a firm par-
ticipating in a pool could be described as:
VP = P, + IP + E - P. - OC,
where P+ is the licensing revenue the firm earns from being in the pool; IP is
the value to the firm of having access to the pooled patents; E is the "external value
the company derived from adding its patents to the pool, such as promoting partici-
pation in the pool and thereby encouraging widespread adoption of the standard"; P.
is the licensing revenue the firm pays to the pool; and OC is the opportunity cost of
joining the pool. 218 Similarly, the value to the firm of abstaining from the pool is:
VA = A, + IP - A. - OC,
where A, is the revenue the firm would derive from licensing its patents out-
side the pool (the FRAND royalty); A- is the revenue the firm would pay to obtain
access to others' patents; and OC is "the opportunity cost of not joining the
pool."2 19 Comparing the two, Judge Robart concludes that, because Motorola's pa-
tents contributed relatively little to the standards at issue, it was fair to assume that
VP = VA (and hence that the opportunity costs "cancel out," as does the IP term if
we assume both firms benefit equally from having access to the other relevant
SEPs).22 0 Moreover, he assumes that P, = E, based on the inference that "the exter-
nal value of joining the pool is equivalent to the royalty deficit Microsoft incurs
through pool membership"; that 2P+ = P., based on evidence that Microsoft paid
twice as much in royalties to the pool as it received in licensing revenue from the
pool (and the assumption that Motorola would have fared no lietter); and that A =
1.5P = 3P+, on the assumption that non-pool royalties would be about 1 2 times
greater than pool royalties ("higher than the pool rate, but not twice as high because
some, if not all, of the companies holding SEPs would be subject to the [F]RAND
217 See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. CIO-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *85 n. 23 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 25, 2013).
218 Judge Robart actually says that OC is "the opportunity cost of using the patents in a different way,
such as abstaining from the patent pool and licensing patents outside the pool." Id. However, I
think he means "the opportunity cost of not using the patents in a different way . . . ." For further
discussion of this point, see the concluding paragraph of this section in the text above.
219 Id. Apparently Judge Robart's assumption is that, except for the firm that is deciding whether to
join the pool, all other firms with relevant patents are in the pool; otherwise there should be a A
term, though perhaps of lesser magnitude, in the first equation.
220 id.
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commitment").22 1 Substituting values gives us A, = 3P,, meaning that the FRAND
royalty is three times the pool royalty.222
There are some errors here, though in the grand scheme of things perhaps none
of them is consequential. First, it would seem that the opportunity cost of not join-
ing the pool is VP, and that the opportunity cost of joining is VA, though ultimately
this factor does not wind up mattering to the judge's analysis (and probably
shouldn't matter in terms of comparing the value of joining the firm versus the val-
ue of abstaining). Second, and more significantly, the assumption that VA = VP
seems unsupported even if there is reason to think that Motorola's patents are rela-
tively low in value. Motorola apparently thought that VA > VP, or it would have
joined the pool (though to be fair, the judge is using this analysis to calculate the
low end of the range). Third, the judge erred when he stated that E "is equivalent to
the royalty deficit Microsoft incurs through pool membership,"22 3 that is that E =
P. In particular, he appears to be conflating E with IP + E. From his earlier analy-
sis, however, all one can say is that, for VP to be positive, P+ + IP + E > P. Thus,
at best, even if the assumption that A = 3P, is correct, the most that can be inferred
is that A, > 2P+ + E. So, the FRAND royalty is at least twice what the pool royalty
would be, plus some increment for the intangible value of being a pool member. It
seems to me that the low end of the FRAND range, therefore, would be just twice
the pool rate, not three times; in theory, E could be as low as zero. If anything,
though, the error works in favor of Motorola, though I doubt that Microsoft would
make much of it since the overall thrust of the opinion strongly favors Microsoft's
224position.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 For a different take on FRAND royalties, see Ericsson Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., No. 6:10-CV-473,
2013 WL 4046225 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013). The opinion denies a defense motion to vacate the
jury's damages award against the defendants (among other matters in dispute). Id. Much of the
analysis is very fact-specific (e.g., was there sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict?) and
thus centers on the expert testimony on comparable licenses, the appropriate royalty rate and base,
etc. Id. For arguments that Judge Davis's analysis of FRAND/SEP issues in Ericsson may be dif-
ferent from Judge Robart's, see Rebutting Judge Robart? E.D. Tex. Judge Leonard Davis Upholds
Jury Damages Award on WiFi SEPs, Dismisses RAND-Related Issues (Ericsson v. D-Link),
ESSENTIAL PATENTS BLOG (Aug. 7, 2013), available at http://essentialpatentblog
.com/2013/08/rebutting-judge-robart-e-d-tex-judge-leonard-davis-upholds-jury-damages-award-
on-wifi-seps-dismisses-rand-related-issues-ericsson-v-d-link/ (suggesting that Judge Davis "seem-
ingly plac[ed] the burden on the defendants to show affirmatively that prior licenses were not ne-
gotiated under the RAND framework," whereas Judge Robart "seemed to place the burden on
Motorola-the SEP holder-to show that its prior comparable licenses were negotiated under the
RAND framework;" and that "Judge Davis found that pointing to theoretical royalty-stacking is-
sues was not sufficient to reduce the damages award" and "noted that the defendants' expert 'never
even attempted to determine the actual amount of royalties Defendants currently pay for 802.11
patents,"' whereas Judge Robart "concluded that because the RAND commitment exists to miti-
gate hold-up concerns, the appropriate RAND royalty for Motorola's patents must take into ac-
count the royalty rates that could be demanded by other SEP holders" and also "did not require
Microsoft to show what royalties it was currently paying for its 802.11-compliant products"). For
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V. Conclusion
This article has presented an overview of the law of contracts, patent remedies,
and competition as they relate to the question of whether courts should enjoin the
infringement of FRAND-encumbered SEPs. At present, objections to injunctions
based on the law of contract and of patent remedies have made more headway in the
United States than in some other countries, Germany in particular. On the other
hand, while the competition-law approach has met with some limited success in the
United States and some defeats in Germany, this approach seems to enjoy only a
limited prospect of success in future U.S. cases at the same time that Europe may be
shifting to an approach more favorable to prospective licensees. In addition, as a
normative matter, I have argued that courts generally should deny injunctions to
SEP owners and should award ongoing royalties instead. These royalties should be
calculated in much the same manner as courts calculate royalties in run-of-the-mill
patent disputes, subject to a couple of tweaks. I also have argued that, in theory, the
law of patent remedies is a better tool for achieving the desired result than is compe-
tition law, though in practice resort to the latter may be acceptable if the necessary
changes to the law of patent remedies are not practically feasible.
Finally, it may be that there are better alternatives to all of the options dis-
cussed above. Among the options other scholars have put forward in recent months
are Jorge Contreras's suggestion of a "pseudo-pool" approach 2 25 and the Lemley-
Shapiro proposal that SSOs require members to submit to binding arbitration.2 26 In
future work, I hope to engage with these and other proposals that go beyond the
scope of the present article. No doubt there may be other possibilities as well; and
perhaps different SSOs could experiment with different possible solutions. One
thing is certain: as standardization and FRAND commitments become ever more
important features of the contemporary economy, our existing legal concepts and
institutions will need to adapt and evolve. In this regard, understanding other na-
tions' experiences, triumphs, and failures may help in determining which practices
to try, adopt, or discard at home.
my initial take on these perceived differences, see Thomas F. Cotter, Friday Round-up: Apple v.
Samsung in the Federal Circuit and Before the ITC; Ericsson, Microsoft, and FRAND-
Encumbered SEPs, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES (Aug. 9, 2013, 1:25 PM) available at
http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2013/08/friday-round-up-apple-v-samsung-
in.html.
225 See Jorge L. Contreras, Fixing FRAND: A Pseudo-Pool Approach to Standards-Based Patent Li-
censing, 79 Antitrust L.J. 47 (2013).
226 See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for
Standards-Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135, 1135 (2013) ("Under our proposed
approach, if a standard-essential patent owner and an implementer of the standard cannot agree on
licensing terms, the standard-essential patent owner is obligated to enter into binding baseball-style
(or "final offer") arbitration with any willing licensee to determine the royalty rate.").
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